The attitudes of the American business community to the Soviet Union, 1917-1933. by Behenna, Patricia J.
University of Massachusetts Amherst 
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst 
Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014 
1971 
The attitudes of the American business community to the Soviet 
Union, 1917-1933. 
Patricia J. Behenna 
University of Massachusetts Amherst 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses 
Behenna, Patricia J., "The attitudes of the American business community to the Soviet Union, 1917-1933." 
(1971). Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014. 1310. 
https://doi.org/10.7275/7cag-wm71 
This thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass 
Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu. 

THE ATTITUDES OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS COMMUNITY
^0 TI-IE SOVIET UNION, I9I7-I933.
BY
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Investigation and examination of some American
attitudes to the Soviet Union, like all attitudinal studies,
pose severe problems for the historian. First, it is
difficult to identify members of the business and banking
community in any detail, because of the anonimity of much
of the source material. It is also difficult to determine
how representative were the viev;s expressed, or if certain
groups of businessmen preferred one kind of action to
another. Even Profesbor Filene, by analyzing the "opinions
and attitudes only of those who made their views known"
does not solve the identity problem.^ Many views on the
Soviet Union were anonymously expressed or reported in a
2business paper like the V/9,11 Street Journal * making it
hard to determine whether these were the opinions of the
reporter, editor or editorial board. How many of the news-
paper's readers shared these views? Were the readers all
businessmen? These remain insoluble problems for the
present, since it has been impossible to locate distribut-
J.on figures for the Journal .
1. P^^tfir g. Filene. Americans and the SQViet.J5:xP_gJ:iiinj£ILfc»
1Q17-1933 . (Cambridge, Mass., t Harvard University Press,
1967. ) p. 3.
2. Hereafter referred to as " Journal " in the text.
Despite these difficulties, and the obvious
limitations inherent in this approach, it is possible
to identify one influential group of American business-
men. These were the "big businessmen", the leaders of
commercial and financial concerns that either had been
connected with the pre-revolutionary Russia or hoped to
develop trade relations with the Soviet Union. Many of
these firms and financial houses possessed branch offices
or headquarters in New York City, were members of various
American-Soviet trade organisations, which were also
based in New York, and were deeply involved with Wall
Street. Other firms, in and out of the Northeast, which
traded with the Soviet Union were also linked to New York,
since they too had to make contracts through the American-
Soviet trade organisations mentioned above. In light of
this it seemed logical to concentrate on two business
organs, namely, the Wall Street Journal , and the NgW YQtbL
Times . The former is particularly stressed, because of its
wide daily coverage of specific business and financial news.
It is also one significant source apparently not dealt
with systematically by Professors Lovenstein and Filene,
in their respective studies of Americaji attitudes to
3the Soviet Union.
Two aspects intrigued me in my examination of
the ilg,yrnal. First, the immediate American business
reaction to both revolutions, and second the part played
by Aratorg, the trading corporation with headquarters in
New York, in moulding American business opinion. In
addition, I v/as interested in discovering how deeply the
widespread anti-Soviet feeling of the 1920 's affected busi-
nessmen and bankers. To v/hat extent were they influenced
by the political strictures of successive antxSoviet
adiTiinistrations? Kow did their fears, if they had any,
affect their business transactions? What were their react-
ions to the Soviet Five Year Plans? Is there any evidence
to show that this business interest group, situated
particularly in New York and more generally , in the North-
east, exerted direct pressure on President Roosevelt for
recognition of the Soviet Union? To v/hat extent wore
American businessmen anti-communist? The main events of
Soviet history from I917 to 1933» and American business
reaction to them, from which the above questions arise.
3. Meno. Lovenstein, ^nprj^cy^n Opinion of Sovi et Russia * (Wash»,D.C.,
American Council on Public Affairs, 19^t).
Peter G. Filene, Americans and the Soviet T^xpe rimgnti 1•917-
1933 . (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1967).
will be examined in chronological order.




What was the banking cominunity' s immediate and
spontaneous response to the actual events of the Russian
Revolution? Surprisingly, neither Meno Lovenstein nor
Peter Filene deal precisely with this question. Yet
investigation of the response reveals how poorly
acquainted American bankers (and businessmen) often were
with internal Russian affairs. Misconceptions formed
during this period had a telling effect on later trade
relations with the Soviet Union.
Initially,
, Russian involvement in the 191^-1918
war was the main concern of American bankers. Internal
Russian disorders were overlooked or were incomprehensible.
When it became obvious that something more than street
rioting v;as in progress in Russia, no one was easily able
to guage the situation accurately, partly from lack of
knowledge, partly from the speed of events.
First reports of the March revolution of 1917
understandably stirred Wall Street and the ^guyn^X reported
that at 1.30 p.m., when news of the Petrograd revolution
came over the tickers, all trading on the floor of the
houfjo came to an abrupt halt. At the time, general Wall
Street opinion was that the disorderj? in Russia were,
mainly expressions of disgust at the supposed pro-
German tendencies of the Tzarist government,^ Affairs
on the market coon returned to normal however, since
banking circles placidly regarded the overthrow of the
autocracy and the eventual emergence oF the Provisional
government under Prince George Lvov as a positive aid
to the allies' cause. It was further thought that the
RuGsians had finally demonstrated their discontent with
Tzarist corruption and inefficiency and were paving the
way for the establishment of a stable, liberal government.'^
A pessimistic note was sounded by those bankers who
feared lest the new Russian administration be socialist
in its philosophy. They regardbd with suspicion the inclus-
ion of the socialist deputy, Alexander Kerensky, as
Minister of Justice. Initially, the alarm felt by American
financiers did not go very deep even though some were
aware of the prevalence of socialist thinking in some sectors
of Russian society.
One banker, obviously cognisant with Marxian
^. Wall Street Journ al. March l6, 1917 (Hereafter, WSJ )
5. March 17, 1917.
7theory, explained that Russia had to go through the
three classsic stages before it could becoine a socialist
state. He emphatically stated that the first, if any,
change in Russia would be towards a limited monarchy as
in England, v/here order and property rights were still
respected. On this basis, he confidently regarded American
war loans to Russia as the safest made to any foreign
country.^ Another optimistic banker predicted increased
American trade and financial business v;ith Russia after
the war. Claiming to speak for New York bankers generally,
he intimated that they believed that no Russian abrogation
n
of debts or contracts would occur. These views cannot
simply be dismissed as shortsighted. First,.it Wa'^, at^
the, tirT\e,i"iP0 2sible to analyse their full significance
for the banking community. Second, the marked distrust
and fear of "socialism" reflected the prevalent
establishment attitude of the period. Third, an emphatic
rule of r.ny banking or business group is to avoid over-
reaction to events as chaotic and perplexing as these,
lest unnecessary financial panic occur, resulting in
loss and confusion.
6. March 17, 1917
7. liiil.
The political structure of Russia underwent
severe changes from March to May 191?. Supreme power
eventually rested v/ith the Provisional government, after
Grand Duke Michael had refused to undertake the task of
government. Conflicting opinions over Russia's continued
participation in the v/ar gave rise to a new cabinet on
May 17, 191?. Foreign Minister Paul Miliukov, representing
moderate elements v;ho v/anted to continue the war to a
victorious conclusion was forced to resign. The effective
leader of the new government was the socialist Kerensky,
ministei^ of "both v;ar and marine. Increasingly, perplexity
and anxiety tinged the optimism of American bankers in the
eventual emergence of democratic governmental forms in Russia.
Few were as honest as one banker who admitted
g
that no one really knew what was going to happen in Russia.
Since this was the case with many banking leaders, they
took what comfort they could from their own hesitant and
often superficial analyses of the revolution's progress.
Even the honest banker above mentioned succumbed to the widely
held belief in American financial circles, that the
Russian situation was not entirely hopeless. And even
8. WSJ. May 7, 1917.
-9-
if the internal Russian situation was serious, it was
considered that these radical changes were transient
phenomena. Hopefully, "time" would erase what an anonym-
ous group of Boston and New York bankers called an "excess
of radicalism." Sounding remarkably like authors of a
twentieth century version of the Federalist Papers , they
continued that it was "...a dangerous thing to give great
masses of mankind too much liberty all in one lump dose,"
especially since liberty often "degenerated into licence."
Piously, they recommended the "education of the masses of
g
tiie people into the use of liberty with restraint." ^ To
another outspoken New York banker, it was "beyond belief"
that men like Prince Lvov would be unable to hold the reins
of pov,'er and restore order and stability,
This "belief" v/as subsequently shattered by the
BolEhevik coup d'etat on October 25» 1917t and the collapse
of the Provisional Government (by that time led by Kerensky).
It was several months, however, before the significance
of the change in Russian leadership was fully comprehended
by American financiers. The American-Russian Chamber of
Commerce even felt confident enough to affirm, on the
eve of a $100,000,000 American loan to Russia, that the
9. -Iliid.
10. iMii.
that the United States was "in a position to be of the
greatest assistance to Russia," through loans and invest-
ment of private capital in Russian industrial development.
This statement hints at the prevailing American myth,
to be developed later, of a potentially vast, virtually
untapped Russian market waiting to be exploited by those
with capital and technical know-how. Another popular
financial attitude reveals exactly how idealistically
the Russian revolution could be contemplated. Bankers
looked back into America's collective experience for
comparable situations and one of them openly likened
Russian events to the American revolution of 1776.
Since ho also implied the possibility of similar results,
he asserted that Russia was better security for a loan
than America had been 140 years earlier. Neatly summing
up this belief in a "Russian revolution for independence,
he ingenuously asked, "what is $100,000,000 to the
United States to be spent, however blindly, to help
12
a sister republic fight for Democracy?"
Perhaps this "blindness" was regretted a year
later, when Russia withdrew from World War I and the
11. V/M. May 1917.
12. liiiii.
-11-
Bolshevik determination to retain power was revealed
during a period of bitter Civil V/ar, The possibility
of a peace treaty between Russia and Germany irritated
American bankers and v/as a constant source of worry.
Prominence was given in business publications to
Trotsky^s negotiations with Germany and to the Treaty
of Brest-Litovsk (which made peace between Russia and
Germany an actuality) v;hich was signed March 3rd, I9I8.
Irritation v/ith Germany also developed out of American
envy of the former country's attempts at greater economic
links with Russia. Ever present also was American fear
of German exploitation of Russian markets in which
American banlcers and businessmen expected to take first
place. To be sure, this fixation with Germany did not
only stem from American disapprobation at Russian-German
peace moves. From I89O till 191^ Germany had been the
largest market fcxT Russian food and raw and semi-manu-
factured goods. Germany , in turn- sold Russia 75^ of all
13
its metal ores and over 505^ of all textile materials.
American attitudes therefore, were conditioned by desire
to limit German economic competition. "Germany's hand
13. R. P. Fisher, "Am-rican Investip.onts in r^^-Sovist Russir."
-12-
closing on Siberian gold." and"Must save Russian banks
from Germany," were samples of headlines from the Journal
for I9I8. In the account which followed the first of these
headlines, Russia was portrayed as being completely in
Germany's exploitative graspt it was also feared that the
war would be prolonged if Germany had access to Russian
gold, "thus causing a price decline. The awesome consequence
would have Germany in control of the "vast resources in
Asia" ready for another struggle, while the United States
would be plunged into debt."''^
The Bolshevik plan to nationalise the banks
also produced American consternation. Frederick M. Corse,
General Manager of the New York Life Insurance Company
in Russia, reported the fate of the private Volga Kama
bank. According to Corse, Russian government officials
had deposed the president of the bank and replaced him
with the "rear yard man. " All private banks, he predicted,
1
would share a similar fate. Not only was nationalization
alien to American economic concepts, but it augured badly
for American hopes of exploiting the rich Russian market,
which they had assured themselves existed. Implicit in this
1^. KM. July 1, I9I8.
15. iiSJ, Dec. 20, I9I8.
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statement was the view that America should assume the
superior role.
The jlaiicnolf in sum, presented a predictable
picture, given the underlying concepts of American
business. There were no surprises. Bankers changed their
attitudes as the Russian revolution changed its direction.
The March uprising had had promising beginnings! the
auotcracy had been threatened and was eventually toppled;
the path towards democracy seemed unimpeded. The
emergence of an aggressive Bolshevism not only shocked
bankers* democratic sensibilities, it also made them
more acutely av.-are of additional and peripheral dangers,
of v/hich the economic throat of Germany was a case in point.
Whether or not Germany, having been badly mauled by v/ar
and left v/ith a shaky economy, was an immediate menace
to American economic interests in Russia was unimportant
for these purposes. American bankers thought the Imperial
Reich possessed the potential to harm them, and viewed
its relations with both countries in that light.
II. Mains-SxiEisii..
Businessmen, like their banking compatriots,
were concerned with the results of both Russian revolut-
ions, and they responded with a similar cautious optimism.
Somo buoinecG concerns lont no time in revealing their
feelings regarding; the March revolution. On March 2l8t,
the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce cabled its
opposite number in Moscow and the American embaony in
Petrograd, expressing its cympathy and extending its
goodwill to the Russian government. Then followed what
was to be a recurrent theme in business thoughti an
explanation of the benefits which would accrue to the
United States from continued economic contact v/ith
Russia. Businessmen exuded an unabashed confidence in
the beneficial effects their proposed trading contacts
would have on Russia's own development. They showed
almost no appreciation of the possible effects that
the March and subsequent uprisings would have on the
political and economic life of that country. For example,
tho American-Russian Chamber of Commerce, convinced that
events in Russia v;ould benefit American interests, claimed
that the "Liberal forces in Russia represented the bulk
of the Russian people and are in close sympathy with the
aims of the United States," The Chamber fully anticipated
that the new Russian government would welcome American
fcapital and enterprise to assist post-war reconstruction.
-15-
This was one of the more potent of the prevailing busi-
ness attitudes and remained so until the intentions of
the Bolaheviks were made painfully clear to Americans.
An example of American economic involvement
at the time of the first revolution, was Russian war
orders. Naturally, businessmen were concerned with the
effects of the revolution on the latter. The Journ?^!
at first reflected the cautious optimism previously
mentionedi in an immediate reaction, a correspondent
considered the economic and trading outlook was favor-
able, but warned that it was too early to make definite
statements. Despite this and similar cautions, Americans
were confident in their ov/n ability to maintain Russian
war orders, and consequently there were frequent reports
of such transactions in the Journal . One such report
explained that the main commodities Russia needed for use
in the war were locomotives for transportation and shells^
for ammunition. Included in one order, the report
continued, was a contract assigning 150 locomotive engines
each to the Baldv/in and American Locom.otive Companies,
the total cost of which amounted to $11,100,000. Neither
firm was said to fear cancellation of the orders by the
16. Vf^J. March 21, 1917.
-16-
new Russian governinent. Total American shell orders for
the Russian army exceeded $200,000,000. The Journal
also optimistically stated that several firms would
benefit from the removal of previous Russian shell
inspection difficulties and from the freeing of working
capital tied up in Russian contracts. One such American
company, Bethlehem Steel, was already profiting from
such a movement- of capital. "^"^
Finally, as if to justify the iLoiimalla ^
confident prediction of favorable and beneficial trade
relations for the United States, a new agreement was
signed in April, I917, for shell parts. The two companies
involved were General Electric which gained $9,000,000
and American Can which gained $5,000,000 in working
capital from this contract. The Journal interpreted this
Russian eagerness for economic agreements as indicative
of a desire to fight a successful war, something which
1 fthad previously seemed doubtful. Since the major
European countries were concerned with the depleting
task of fighting each other, America became Russia's
chief source for v/ar material. American businessmen
!?• liSsIt March 20, 1917. Other concerns interested in the
shell contracts were American Can, General Electric,
Bartlett-Hayward, International Steel and Ordnance, and
International Steam Pump Companies. A rifle contract with
Russia was also obtained by Westinghouse Electric and
Manufacturing Company.
18. WSJ, April 3, 1917.
17
were porcuaded that their own analysis was right and pointed
to the phenomenal rise in exports to Russia as proof
not only of her desire to win, but also of her wish to
19
extend her markets. " Naturally, much of this Russian desire
was engendered by a war-time need for arms, ammunition
and other manufactured goods. It did however, encourage
businessmen to predict, even on this basis, increased
American-Russian trade after the war haa ended and the
Russian internal situation had resolved itself.
Transportation was another important area of
the Russian v/ar effort and once more American businessmen
played a vital role. In May 1917» Daniel Willard, president
of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and chairman of the ad-
visory board of the Council of National Defence, announced
that a railroad commission was being formed at the request
20
of the Russian government. Two American businesses,
namely, American Car and Foundry and Standard Steel Car
companies quickly found themselves with orders for 6,500
21
and 3,500 engines respectively.
The March revolution, therefore, in its first
impact on American business, left the solid economic
19. V/SJ , March 21, 1917- Exports to Russia from U.S.A. had
risen from a 1915 total of $170,000,000 to $^69,000,000
in 1916.
20. W^liI, May 1917.
21. iiiiJ:, May 30, 1917
-18-
foundation formed by war virtually untouched. Initially,
businessmen regarded the Russian situation as a temporary
phenomena. The latter would not last, they imaginedi. a
responsible, democratic government was sure to take over,
now that Tzarist tyranny had been effectively overthrovm.
With hindsight, this may seem to us a naive outlook. But
the businessman generally left politics to the politician,
and only considered the violent interhal Russian events in
the context of trade, which, after all, was his primary
concern. This attitude was reflected in the Journal .
On the one hand, disgust was expressed at the "socialist
22
menace" prevalent in Russiai on the other, business
fears were temporarily assuaged by the report that Russia's
commercial dependence would continue.
There was no discussion of the reports of the
Bolshevik revolution in the Journal and the drama of the
cQun d'etat was completely overlooked. Contracts, contacts
and profits v;ere understandably uppermost in the business-
man's mind. For example, Kerensky* s overthrow brought
nothing more than a notice of a New England shoe manufact-
urer's opening bids for 3,300,000 pairs of shoes for Russia.
Similarly, businessmen were relieved to learn that the
2^
22. WSJt June 16, I917.
23. WSjI, Oct. 8, 1917
24. liSil, Nov. 13, 1917.
ft
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November 191? contracts for 648 engines and 30,000 cars,
divided between American Car and Foundry, Standard Steel
Car, Pressed Steol and Pacific Car companies, remained
intact. Businessmen ignored the political arena and
concentrated all their energies on the lucrative Russian
trade. They were justified in so doing. Figures compiled
by th6 National City Bank of New York revealed that export
values from 191^-1917 equalled the total for the 50
preceding years, which was estimated at $1,000,000,000.
The Journal also supplied its own figures for the years
1900-1917* which amply show the steady rise in value of
27American exports to Russia. The phenomenal rise in value
during the years I916-I9I7 v/as obviously caused by the
many large Russian war orders.
The belief that Bolshevik rule ,( imperfectly
understood by the American business community) would be
shortlived, persisted for several years, but was at its
most potent from I917-I9I8. The chaotic situation in
Russia, engendered by the v;ar and revolutions, famine
and food shortage, and the discontent bred from years
of privation made this attitude seem plausible at the time
25. WS.J, Nov. 22, 1917.
26. WSJf June 26, 1917.
, , K
27. iiiii, Sept. 11, 1917. For list of figures, see Appendix A
-20-
One article in the Journ?i l for December, I917, bore the
heading "Revolution in Russia based on food shortage."
There followed a brief report from J. Ralph Pichell,-
secretary of the Council of Grain Exchanges. In his
opinion, Kerensky's overthrow had been due to his gross
ineptitude in handling food supplies. It was therefore
inevitable, continued Pichell, that Kerensky v/ould be
supplanted and that the Bolsheviks would assume "temporary
28power. " Comments and reports in the Journal made
frequent mention of the supposed transient nature of
the Bolf'hovik government. One such editorial, headed
"An awakening Giant" stressed that Russia was becoming
a"tremendous force for good" and would continue along
this path "if rightly directed." Russia, advised the
editor of the Journal , needed "sympathy and understanding."
He felt that, despite the fact that Russia's government-
al experiments seemed to reveal socialist tendencies,
"ultimalaly" the new system would "reflect the true
spirit of the Russian people." Although not stated,
the inference was that the "true spirit" would not be
socialistic. A report in the Joyrnal for late November,
28. WSJ. Dec. 14, 1917.
29. mi, Nov. 10, 1917.
21
1917 further illustrated the optimism expressed by busi-
nessmen over the Russian situation. In an article
enumerating the recent American-Russian contracts, the
writer revealed that traders believed the Russian up-
heavals to be only "temporary" and that "responsible
government" would shortly assume control.
Discovering that Bolshevism was not to be
easily ousted from power, the Journal predictably
revealed hardened attitudes as former expressions of
optimism swiftly disappeared. When the communist aims
of the new Russian leaders, particularly Lenin, became
more widely known, business leaders grew alarmed. The
chilling prospect of having their financial investments
and commercial contracts placed in immediate and constant
jeopardy made the Russian revolutionaries look like
descendants of Machiavelli. Numerous diatribes appeared
in the Journal, directed mainly at Trotsky, possibly
because of his former American connections. This "arch-
villain" was compared to Judas Iscariot, accused of
demoralising the Russian army, and condemned as the
Kaiser's agent. Far from sympathising with the revolut-
22
ions in Russia at this juncture, the Journal abandoned
all attempts to view the revolutions in a favorable
light and countenanced a return to autocracy as the
only way to restore orderly government.
The fear of German exploitation of Russian
resources bothered businessmen as it had done bankers,
and acquired an even more serious nature as the details
of Bolshevik government became clearer. Now it seemed
to businessmen, the United States had the dual task of
saving Russia from herself and from Germany. A I9I8 June
editorial exhorted the American government to donate
money and lend moral support, while Japan supplied the
32
manpower.-^ Ominous reports of the fate of existing
American trading ventures in Russia further dampened
the commercially acquisitive spirit, formerly heart-
ened by the overthrow of the autocracy. The fate of
thriving Russian banking and financial concerns was
now mirrored by that of American firms. Made prosperous
during the early war years, they were now beginning to
suffer at the collectivising hands of the revolutionaries.
The Journal reported that the Submarine Boat Corporation
31. mi% May 3t I9I8.
32. WSJ, June 20, I9I6.
23
was disintegrating, following Russian v/ithdrawal from the
war front. Similarly, Bethlehem Steel, Midvale Steel
Corporation, Westinghouse, Remington Arms, National
City Bank and others, had lost capital and profits.
Despite these initial setbacks, some business-
men eagerly accepted the legend of the vast potential
of the Russian market. Since the situation in post-
war Russia made it often difficult for business, repres-
entatives to obtain first hand information^ almost anyone
who returned to comment on the Soviet scene was regarded
with interest and was heard attentively. One such source.
Sterling H. Brunnell, a New York engineer, writing (in
the American Machinist ) on the Russian need for agricultural
tools and machinery, gave further credence to the legend.
A great opportunity for trade now existed for American
machinery manufacturers, he maintained. It was unthinkable,
he continued, that American businessmen should allow
Germany to exploit Russia's raw materials and markets.
Brunnell described the precise nature of the latter, thus
giving businessmen an idea of what they could expect to find.
The most desirable commodities offered by Russia were, in
33. WSJ , April 16, 1918.
2k
his opinion, hnr vast quantities of raw materials—hides,
flax, furs, minerals and agricultural products. There was
nothing new about this information, yet Brunnell's reit-
eration of it at this time is typical of those who argued
for immediate American commercial intervention in Russia.
Brunnell pointed out that Americaii interests would benefit
since- there was a shortage of these raw materials in the
United States. Benefits would be reciprocal, however,
and Russia needed all the assistance she could get, since
she faced famine, an aftermath of war and internal upheaval.
Brunnell therefore urged businessmen to make trading
arrangements so that Russian materials could be exported
to, and sold in, America, and that the dollars Russia
obtained could then be used to buy its much needed
machinery.-"^ Businessmen were assailed from all sidos»
Edward N. Hurley, chairman of the U.S. Shipping Board,
strongly urged the Illinois Manufacturers Association
to look for a"world market" after the war. It is highly
35
possible that Soviet Russia was in his thoughts. -^^ The
American-Russian Chamber of Commerce also took part in
building up the hopes of businessmen. It boldly declared
3^. Literary Di.^est* April 16, 1918.
35. ii^t June 29. 1918.
25
that there was a market in the United States for $60,000,000
to $75tOOO,000 worth of Russian raw materials. Thus,
the viev/s of men like Sterling Brunnell received official
approval. Although businessmen and coranentators v/ere
aware of the benofits American trade v;ould have for Russia,
this was more often implicitly understood than expressly
stated. While there is nothing unusual in this response,
one might have expected more awareness of the difficulties
of capitalist trade with a communist country. But then,
businessmen daily expected the overthrow of the Bolsheviks
ajid the return of "responsible" government.
This accelerated interest in Soviet Russia
penetrated the administration and reached presidential
level. A Russian bureau was formed in the United States
called the "War Trade Board of the United States Russian
Bureau." Organised at the behest of the President, its
purpose was to enable the Russians to gain their own
economic stability. It was quite separate from the American
Relief Administration, which, under the direction of Herbert
Hoover, coordinated American efforts to ease the plight of
many starving Russians. The Russian bureau had a capital
36. iiSilf August 15i I9I8.
-26-
stock of $5,000,000, cvmed and issued by the United States
government. Its specific task was to assist in the export
of agricultural implements, shoes and clothing to Russia
and Siberia. Renewed trading opportunities for American.
firms and the possibilities of obtaining rav; materials
37
were to be America's rev/ard.^' Although the intention
of such a bureau was not solely philanthropic, this
bureau and the American Relief Administration were
welcomed as humane examples of the potentialities of
capitalism in contradistinction to soviet techniques.
To say that the business community of the
American Northeast possessed little accurate knowledge
of the revolutions in Russia, or could have satisfactorily
guaged their outcome, is to say very little. Businessmen
were not alone in their hope and belief that the Soviet
regime would be short-livedt most of Western Europe held
similar views in 1918. American businessmen, while deplor-
ing Soviet policies, continued to seek the profitable
Russian markets which had become part of the commercially
attractive "conventional wisdom" of the time. Businessmen
37. Dec. 3t 1918.
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were not totally unroaliGtic. They know that the profit-
able incrcaEG in U.S.-Runaian trade had come mainly
from enormous v;ar orders. NevcrtholGcs, thoy intended
to capitalise (literally and figurately) on contacts
and connections already established.
-28-
It may ceem a tran,^e to include opinionc
from a 'non-businessman' in the strict sense of the word
but it
-was done for several reasons. First, most busines
men and bankers remain anonymous over their attitudes to
Sociot Union. Business and banking; opinion in general
was therofor(» recorded by newspaper editors, like that
of the V/pll Strg et Journal, William Peter Hamilton.
His editorials r;ive the impression that they were com-
posed not only for the benefit of the bip businessmen,
but also for lessor business lif?;lits who were interested
and involved in the financial worJd of Wall Street. Thus
his editorials were often blunt and direct, couched in
non-commercial languafi;e, so that everyone could under-
stand. Such importance did he hold amonp; the Journn l *s
staff as their editor-in-chief, that an unprecedented
three columns of an inside paf?;e v/ere devoted to biog-
raphical comments. -^^ Durin^^ the interview, conducted by
Thomas H. Ormsby, Mr. Hamilton discussed his projected
role for the Journal t although he did not make specific
38. 1VSJ[, Sept. 12, 1922.
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reference here to the Soviet Union, knowledge of the aims
and attitudes he brought to bear on his editorial subjects
helps clarify his later opinions.
Hamilton was fully acquainted with the business
world, having been formerly an office-boy to a London
stockbroker, before moving into financial journalism in
America as editor of the Jsnmait on January 1, 1908.
V/riting, he commented, interested him more than" stock-
broking and clerking." This experience, however,
afforded him an opportunity to loam from the inside the
workings and fluctuations of the Stock market. Before
coming to America, ho travelled widely and remarked on
the business genius of.. the late J.Pierpont Morgan. Only
one other man in his opinion, approached Morgan for
"intuitive intelligence", and that was Cecil Rhodes,
whose "definite ideas and large concepts" were "far
above the mere making of money. " He arrived in the
United States at the outbreak of the Boer War, on the
invitation of Thomas F. Woodlock, a partner of Dow, Jones
and Company, owners of the Wall Street Journal . Hamilton's
duties were to keep V/all Street accurately informed about
39. V/SJ. Sept. 12. 1922.
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the Boer'V/ar»s progress and "its market importance"
.
His commentaries during 1919-1922 on U.S. -Soviet political
and economic relations probably had a similar aim. Kov/ever,
his Boer War reports did not consume all his time, and so
he invented for the Dow-Jones Financial News Service, the
Stock Market paragraphs f which were speedily incorporated
as a standing feature of the Service and of the Wall Street
Journal. Hamilton maintained that his information helped
active brokerage firms and sustained interest in the
market. He then spoke of the close working relationship
which had existed for tv;enty years between him and the
proprietor of the Journal # Clarence W. Barron, himself
a frequent contributor. The interviev;er, Ormsby, described
Hamilton's editorials as being "hard-hitting, clearly
stated, brief...". Hamilton also believed in "short,
pithy editorials" which left the reader with one main
idea and not, as he expressed it, a "multiplicity of
unrelated ideas." This is closely allied to the chief
editor's overall conception as to the way in which one should
approach a subject for report. He cautioned thust "Don't
^believe the man who tells you that there are two sides to
41. WSJ, Sept. 12,1922.
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every question. There is only one side to the truth." ^3
Above all. Hamilton concluded, the aim of the Journ^lt
was " to take the quackery and mystery out of Wall Street.
"
From his background and his opinions, I think it is fair
to acknowledge the potential competencey of Hamilton in
reporting economic and financial affairs. His lengthy ten-
ure in the editor's chair would suggest general (albeit
tacit) acceptance of his views and would seem to make him
an ideal representative of American big business interests.
Hamilton advocated trade between America and
Soviet Russia at an early date, and at a time when this
view was unpopular with the Administration in Washington.
The United States had participated in the allied embargo
on trade with the Soviet Union. First, when the Provisional
governmen-b was overthro\\Ti in November 1917, all unlicensed
trade with Russia was stopped. After February 1918, licences
were no longer granted without permission from the State
Department and by 1919 all export licenses were revoked.
Even after these restrictions were lifted (January 16, 1920)
official U. S. policy stipulated that Russian trading
43. Ibid.
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would henceforth be undertaken entirely at the individual's
own risk. In one of his first editorials on American-Soviet
relations, Hamilton stated: "There may be few things more
distasteful than a recognition of the Lenine regime but
are there any that promise better and quicker returns to
Europe and perhaps to the world? Laying aside natural
feelings of revulsion. v/e may see enough economic and
financial arguments for an early resumption of trade with
Russia." It is interesting to note the implicit restate-
ment of the American dream of untapped Russian markets,
and an acknowledgement that trade must and should continue
despite the uncongenial politics.
P4en who returned from living and working in
Russia frequently reinforced businessmens* optimism on
U.S. -Soviet trade. One such American, Albert Coyle,who
had been taken prisoner in Russia, had his views published
in Nation. K<s exp^^iimi that it was judicious for America
to take advantage of a new market » ti^e Bol^Vvsvite r«i.vo\uUon
had swept av/ay onerous import duties and had ended previous
domination of the Russian market by other countries. Coyle
had three positive suggestions for American businessmeni
^5. WSJ , Feb. 28, 1920.
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they should erect a pennanent exhibition of Amorican goods
in Moscow, extend short term credit to the Rujjsian gov-
ernment and build cable connections with Northern Europe.
He concluded his article with the pithy observation that
"communication" was the "life of trade." It can be seen
from this and from previous statements of American business
men, how widespread was the concern for expanding markets
abroad, especially into Russia.
Despite Hamilton's enlightened attitude to
American-Soviet trade, his attitude hardened on the home
front. In his encouragement of inter-continental trade.
Hamilton may have envisaged that contact with the Russian
communists could demonstrate the superiority of the
capitalist system. Amorican influence v/ould therefore
be experienced monetarily and morally, to the detriment
of communism. At homo, he deplored any overt signs of
communism. The tendency to attribute internal American
disorders during 1919'"1920 to communism did not stem
solely from Attorney -General Mitchell Palmer. Such also
^7
was editor Hamilton's opinion of the 1919 steel strike.
46. Nation
.
April 10, 1920, pp. 454-456.
47. WSJ . Sept. 30, 1919.
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To trade with a nation enduring communist rule was
permissible (despite the fact that the American govern-
mentdiscouraged such activity) i contamination v/ith
communist ideology inside one's own country was in-
defensible. Hamilton admired the article of Clarence
W.Barron (proprietor of the Journal ^ on the effects of
Bolshevism as experienced in Soviet Russia. Here, in
a dramatic portrayal, "crafty Lenine, Trotsky and other
leaders hitched discontent, oppression and poverty to
a chariot and v;ere drawn to place, power , loot and lust.
Despite the changes wrought in Russian society and the
promises of the Bolshevik leaders, Barron continued,
"Russia has not seen peace and bread. " The Soviet leaders
actions* were seen as betrayals and consequently Barron
likened them to those of Aaron Burr, Caesar Borgia and
^8 .
Judas Iscariot. No room for reason was allowed in
statements such as these. Words which v/ere calculated to
inspire fear and hate v/ere used, such as 'loot* and *lust
Barron and Hamilton were both convinced that
communism was spreading throughout American society.
Capitalist society was seriously threatened, since it was
48. WSJ, Oct. 22, 1919.
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the "arch-enemy" of the Bolsheviks and the latter wished
to destroy it. Nor was this fear totally unreasonable.
Soviet theories of v/orld revolution were by this time
well kno\m. Barron believed that Russian propaganda had
had an effect already, since American irianual workers,
educated men, graduates and lav/yers were, he feared,
expounding revolutionary doctrines, including the
I4.Q
destruction of the state. ^ A relieved Hamilton noted
the Chamber of Commerce meeting of 700, who had met to
oppose Bolshevism constructively. At the meeting, the
Governor of Massachusetts, Calvin Coolidge, exhorted
them to resurrect "ainericani sm". Only this, in his
estimation, would counter propaganda that fostered
discontent. Hamilton, it will be remembered, believed
that there was "only one side to the truth". Therefore,
matters were clear-cuti capitalism stood for freedom,




Hamilton comforted his readers ( and presumably
himself) with the belief that there was no great cause
for alarm, because Bolshevism would disappear of its own
^9. l^Si. Oct. 22, 1919.
50. iiSjIt Nov.l5» 1919.
51. iiSi. April 17, 1920.
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volition.-^ The use of the word "Bolshevism* continued
for several years in the jJ^lvjcnailc articles despite the •
establishment of a potentially permanent Soviet communist
government. The v^ord was employed in a derogatory sense
and was intended to conjure up an image of a communist
similar to that portrayed in many contemporary cartoons.
(These cartoons v;ere syndicated and frequently appeared
in the Journal at this time. ) This image was half
mythological, half barbarian, intent on wilful destruction
of western civilisation. It is true that many of the fears
raised by Hamilton and others were legitimate, but it
would have been interesting and valuable to have read
in the Journal a critique of communism in less rhetorical
terms. The lack of such analysis is perhaps a r'eflection
only of their greater interest in trade. It also reflects
however, their inability to acknowledge the commercial
ramifications communism might have on Ameri6an-Soviet
trade. Hamilton personally represented the ' 'die-hard*
attitude, in which everything was either black or white.
The majority of his readers, it v;ould be reasonable to
52. WSJ, March 30f 1921 i June 7» 1922.
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arinumo, proferred bunlneco news and the Dow-Joncn indust-
rials to lengthy anrayRoa of communist activity. Editorials
wore therefore kept to a minimum and complex developments
reduced to r;enoralinntions, subtle nuancon enveloped under
the various cloaks of "cnpi talimn"
, "communism", "socialiBm",
"aovietism", and "americanism". Here arain, Hamilton was
earrylng out nn intention exprenned in hln bior;raphical
reporti editorials should bo nhort and contain one main
idea. In thio way there v/as lenr; likelihood of the reader
btcomin/-; confuted. It wan alno oanier (uning thic method)
to persuade the reader that there Koa no other side to
the quention worth oxaminiiT^-!;.
Opinions similar to tlione of the editor appeared
Gloewhore in the Jojrrtiai. Frank )1. Vandorlip, precidont
of the National City Bank of New York, and H.P. Davison,
from J.P,Mor£;an and Co., included a tour of Soviet Russia
on their rocpcctivo European vicits. Doth men agreed that
America could f^ivo ansistancc only after "stable f^overnment"
was ostablishod. -^-'^ In a special article. Captain Wilfrid
E. Playfair, historian with the Canadian Expeditionary
Force in Siberia, reassured readers that Bolshevism was
53. \VSJ_, IVlay~20, 1919 1 Mcay 24, W?^
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" doomed". This presumably was why the opinion of a historian
found its way into the pages of a business newspaper. This
historian continued that in his opinion, a socialist"
republic Y;ould emerge, acceptable because it would be a
"democracy", something that the Bolsheviks could not offer.
It is difficult to determine upon what exact evidence
this assumption was made, but it is true that the early
days of the Civil War were confusing. Initially, the
anii-Bolshevik forces scored impressive successes under Den-
ikin and Kolchak. However, by the summer of 1919t Kolchak
(praised by Playfair as a "democrat") was frequently
harassed v;hile leading the White Russians and was ultimately
defeated by the Bolsheviks.
American fear of internal Bolshevik influence
can.be instanced by an advertisement from Swift Company,
Union Stock Yards, Chicago, vindicating their.packers from
v/hat they termed accusations of unjust price-fixing.
Implicit in their statement was the belief that any dis-
ruption of the economic status quo would inevitably lead




5^1-. \7SJ, July 3* 1919.
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of Amorican indiintrinl. crrnni v.ation and of itn bonofltn
to mankind" load "to unrcnt.dinr.atiafaction nnd radical! nm. " ^'^
WarnJnr.G of Dolnhovih cunninr; and nubtloty wore frrqvKnt,
bunlnonninon wore constan tly oxhortod to beware " inr-:idi oun"
propaf^pndn, tho nolo aim of which wan to diccrodit Amoricon
buninonr; and capitnl inannf-;f>inont. Undormininr; capitalicm
at homo war; intolorabloi trading; with Communinta abroad
wae not. Comieroial profit would holp bolstor capitalinm»
thufj norvinf-; to prove tho lattor'c nuporiority.
In 1921, yet another occuronco wan to convince
buninonnmen of the invincibility of cnpitalinm. Dovantatl 6n.
economic chaoG and famine v/cre tho lcf';acy of tho Kucnian
Civil War. In I92I, Lonin docidod that bocaUEO of the diro
situation, a purely nocialist form of production v.ould
have to b6 set anido temporarily. It v/an relncod by n
new Ryntom of "ntate capitaliom". Unified manorcrnent of
industry r.ave way to "trurtn" and (more importantly and
Bif^nificantly for American tradorn) the invo.ntmont of
forel.'^n capital wao permitted by tho introduction of a
concerjnionf; nyatom. Thia Now Economic Policy led Amoricans
to boliovo that it wan only a matter of time before
55. ws.i, Oct. 7. 1919.
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" communism" surrendered to "capitalism". Increased trade
might hasten this desired process and at the same time
be profitable. Businessmen must have been heartened at the
words of Senator Joseph France of Maryland. He unofficially
investigated Soviet trading conditions. Travelling via
England, he met the Russian Trade Mission and learned
that England received valuable trade infonnation from it
daily. Senator France rapidly concluded that America
should achieve a similar business rapport. He maintained
that to trade with Soviet Russia was now the only "wise,
humane, and profitable policy." America, he urged, should
begin negotiations at once, if only because England and
Germany were developing maximum trade connections with
Russia. As if to give added emphasis to his exhortations
for American-Soviet trade relations, Senator France also
mentioned that he v/as collecting data, during his European
visit, in support of his Senate resolution for resumption
of relations with Soviet Russia.- It is difficult to
imagine editor Hamilton concurring in Senatof- Hamilton's
pro-Russian feelings, but he probably symp<athised mth
the idea of trading, since such contact might convince
56. m» May 25f 1921.
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the Coriinunists of the strengths and stabilities of the
capitalist system. And mention has already been made
of Hamilton's belief that an early resumption of trade
would be beneficial to the United States. ^"^
V/hatcver might be said of Hamilton's condescend-
ing attitudes to the Soviet regime, he was a realist in
economic affairs, and was not afraid to state his views
on the business scene. His general attitudes v/ere, in
any case, shared by the majority of American businessm.eni
a confidence in the capitalist system, and the belief
that it v/as possible to divorce economics from politics.
Thus, they could afford to exploit the one and ignore
(while inwardly deploring ) the other.
57. See page 32.
Chapter 3« Amfmi^an Bankers p.nd Busino nnTnon nnd f^oylptr
I. B^vV o.rr., 1910-1P?4 .
One of the nost persistent post-v,'ar problems given
full coverage in the Journal, was that of settling inter-
national v/ar debts and bond payments. The Soviet attitude
towards the latter was a recurring source of anxiety for
American bankern. For example, the month of January I919
was filled with constant rumour and speculation over the
fate of $50,000,000 of Imperial Russian credit certificates.
Russian bond issues suffered stock Exchan^o losses on the
New York market and having learnt of Soviet repudiation
of external debts, bankers feared default. By July I9l9i
a ncv/ly-formed committee of bankers and financiers drew
up a protective agreement to assist those holders affected
by the expected default on the $50»000,000 of Imperial
credit certificates. As an indication of the gravity of the
situation, the committee was composed of some of the
financial world's leading bankers. These included John
R. Fulton of the National City Bank of New York, Thomas
58. mi* Jan. 9. 1919
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Cochran of J. P. Morgan and Co., N.Dcan Jay of the Guaranty
Trunt Co., and Albert R. Wiggins, vice-president of the
Foreign Securities Committee of the Investment Bankers*
Association of America.
Despite anxiety over Russian financial obligations,
bankers were loath to let slip any opportunity for foster-
ing possible Russian financial dependency upon the United
States. "Bankers to help Build up war-v/recked Europe" was
a characteristic headline in the loiLnnl. John J. Arnold,
vice-president and head of the foreign department of the
First National Bank, gave the address before a commission
<3f Nov/ York and Chicago bankers, of which he v/as also a
member. In his speech, he exhorted bankers to visit
Europe, including Russia, v;ith two aimsi one, to help fin-
ance rehabilitation programs in European cities; tv/o, to
restore connections with their branch banks in these
countries. This meeting was closely followed by one
organised by the American Bankers' Association. Once
again, its members were told to support by every possible
means "...the development of the export trade... and to
59. im, July, 10, 1919,
60. I^, Jan 20, 1919.
provide as rapidly as possible, adequate facilities for
financing export opportunities." ^'^
1919 v/as also the year of the 'Red Scare* and,
increasingly, official and popular opinion turned against
the Soviet government. Although the year had begun with
bankers optimistic on re-opening banking channels with
Soviet Russia, within three months, a marked change in
attitude had occurred. In a curt reply to a rumour that
the Soviet government had asked for an American loan,
bankers now retorted that it was an "absurd suggestion. "
Understandably influenced by prevailing sentiments of
hostility, bankers could now point out " that it would
scarcely be sound or proper to finance a loan for a
foreign government that not been recognised by the U.S.
62government," Seemingly inconsistent with the afore-
mentioned desire to deal financially with Soviet Russia,
this attitude may also have been induced by the complicated
and frustrating Soviet fiscal policies of revaluation
introduced at this time. The Soviet 'rumour* serves as a
reminder that the Soviet government was by no means a
passive bystander in these events. In March 1921 » when
61. i^/Silf Jan. 22, 1919^
62. MM, March 7, 1919.
leadership of the Administration changed from Wilson to "
Harding, the Soviet government appealed to President and
Congress, making a formal proposal that trade relations
with America be resumed. Contained in this formal prop-
osal was the Soviet desire to "break down the "wall"
between the United States and Russia." However,
the Soviet government soon discovered that the new admin-
istration regarded it with disfavor. For instance, post-
war economic reconstruction v.'as discussed at the Genoa
conference held during April 1922. Tv/o main allied aims
predominated! first, a solution to the debt problem and
second, resumption and development of trade relations.
This was the first international diplomatic gathering
to include Soviet representatives. Other war powers
of the time included Great Britain, Belgium, France and
Italy, but the United States was not represented. American
attendence, in the eyes of the Harding administration
would have implied de ,iure recognition, which was still
refused. Officially, the United States government merely
expressed goodwill and the hope that the debt question
jwould..be solved.
63. WSJ . March 2^, 1921.
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The ^[oMiml reported all the Soviet moves and
countermoves regarding debts with unabating interest,
knov/ing that many interests besides the government's \ve(^
directly involved. The newspaper's report on April I7, was
thdt Russia would recognise all pre-war debts, but by April
21, this had been altered to a Soviet recognition of pre-
war debts (x{v\ war debts were specifically rejected. By
April 22, the Soviet stand had become even more specific.
Russia would now recognise only correctly tabulated pre-
war debts and demanded allied financial aid and recognit-
64
ion. Afxsr all this deliberation and bargaining the
Soviet government rounded off its demands by again
requesting an American loan. The Journal indignantly
retorted that the Soviet government had "all the crudity
of a thief's disordered mind," The newspaper concluded
that this was another example of Soviet audacity, the
arch-villains being once again Lenin and Trotsky. On
this occasion the Journal was glad of govemmental support
the State department and the President being commended for
refusing to "temporise with this evil thing." It is
not hard to understand American disgust with the Soviet
64. WSJ, April 17« 1922i April 21, 1922i April 22, 1922.
65. April 18, 1922.
delegation at Genoa, especially since negotiations had
not gone in favor of the United States. With American
non-cooperation, allied disagreement and a separate
Russian treaty with Gcrraany in Rapallo, April 16, 1922,
it was not surprising that the Genoa conference failed.
The debt problem remained largely unsolved and again
Ameri6an bond holders were placed in jeopardy. The prot-
ective committee of prominent American financiers and >
bankers mentioned before, filed claims on behalf of its
depositors with the State department. But any speedy
result from this move v/as not to expected, since the
claims were to be met only when the government obtained
Russian payment on defaulted securities.
American bankers* caution in dealing with the
Soviet Union was further increased by the considerable,
though not devastating, losses incurred by some American
firms in Russia. These, including American government
war loan-3, totalled $500,000,000. Among the most prest-
igous was the New York Life Insurance Company, whose St.
Petersburg branch opened in 1885. After the Russian revol
utions and the war, it had lost $33fOOO,000 of cash and
Jan. 20, 1923.
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67BocuritiGO. Combinod rocourcoij of ;1)34, 391 , 000 from tho
National City Bank's two branchoo in Potrof^rnd and
Vladivostok woro lost aftor tho Goviot bank nati onalifsation
68in I91.B. Of tho bir: cornmorcial companion, Gingor Sowing
Machin(» and nonoral Eloctric Companies lost investmnnt
totnlr: of t^o^^ t 000 , 000 and :1";\000,000 r«Bpoc tivoly. Of
tho moro fortunate, tho Submarine Boat Company oufforod no
finnnciril loan, althou,":h itn contractr; woro t(>nninatodi
Standrird Oil of Now Jv.rr^^y romainod Jiopoful of acquiring
69
privilor.os from ito pro-rovolutionary proporty.
Conoidoring tho finrmcial locooni market dio-
f
location, froquonl Soviot nfforto to itabilloe tholr
monotnry nyotom and bnnk nationalisation, Amotican bnnk-
5nfr reaction wan, thou/^h at times inconoistont, undor-
ntandably cautioua and roctrainod. Whilo thoro woro
often pun^ont Amorican crit i.ci:;ma 0 (' tho alien nyntom
and id(K)io/';y, thoro woro nliio thono nufficiontly woll
noaBonod in fincal mattori; who winhod to expand t)ieir
pre-war Hunnian contacts or boldly, to create new onor;.
It la alr>o truo that, since tht Soviet r.ovornmont
altornatoly thrcatonod American capitalinln and thon
67. l^'^y I9--1 H.H. Finher, Amoricnn Invor.tmontn in
Pro-Soviot Hunnla, AmCXlcuilJJJLlYiiLJiricUiJiJa-t-iluriii^^^^^
RnyX"Yl» 7-'^^ l<)h9, ?iVO-- Mr. Fif'hor no Um: that by
191M,
tho Compnny pofiMonnod Hunolan bondn to Lho vnJuo of about
,t«?9» 300,000 (monlJ v rai lro;rl ntock).
68. WUJ.. May 19^2.
69. )h\A'
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demanded credit facilities and loans from them, many
bankers long remained loath to extend credit to the
Soviet Union.
II. Businosnr.en. 1-919-1 Q?^i- .
The outlook for trading v;ith the Soviet Union
during: this period was inauspicious . Although trade
restrictions v.-ore lifted in 1920, the State departnent
refuE-ed to
€x\^rid. its official and pov/erful support to
collective trading with the Soviet Union. The Administration
v/ould not recognise the Soviet governnent: many in American
government circles and in business, refused to give up the
hope that somehov/ the Soviet government would collapse.
Consequently, an ambivalent attitude can be detected in the
business world. On the one hand, lay the obstacles to easy
trade and the innate hostility of the Soviet government to
the capitalist system t on the other, lay the persistent
lure of Russian markets. Since the State department had
no objection to businessmen trading at their ovm risk,
and the Soviet policy towards foreign trade softened with
the inception of the New Economic Policy (NEP), various
American advances were made.
-50-
Undor NEP, the Soviet GOvern.T.ent granted trading
concessions to foreign countries, so that the skills of
Soviet state. There were several kinds of concessions
and the^r operated v/ithin all sectors of the economy. The
largest single group numerically was concerned with the
development of raw materials. The "pure" concession was
an agreement between the Soviet government and a foreign
enterprise whereby the foreign firm was permitted to
develop and exploit a carefully selected opportunity
within the USSR. The foreign concern could not obtain
property rights under this scheme. It v/as positively
obligated to invest capital, introduce V/estern technology,
and give royalty payments to the Soviet governjncnt. There
v/ere also less comprehensive, but nonetheless valuable,
technical assistance contracts, in which foreign count-
70
rios were invited to participate. It has been felt
necessary to include this brief description of the Soviet
concessions policy, to show that not all the Anierican
advances were the result of exploitative greed, (although
they may have sometimes sounded so) but were frequently
the latter could materially assis t the rebuilding of the
-51-
the ronult of a joint acreemont.
Ono such private concern favored by the Soviet
Union v;as the Hammer family. Perhapc one reason for this
was the fact that Dr. Julius Hammer (born in Runnia 187/4-,
died in the United States I9'f8) had been a founding member
of the Communist Party of the United States in June I919.
In 19^3» the Hammer family operated jointly v/ith the
Russinns, the Allied American Corporation (Alamerico) sharing
both capital and profits on a fifty-fifty basis. In addition,
the Hammers were {granted (also in I923) a f^eneral trading
concGEsion, which gave them the right to establish an office
in Moscow and to represent a large number of American
71
companies.
Nor did this concession policy concern itself
solely v/ith ideologically sinnpathotic customers. For instance,
during this period, Standard Oil of New Jersey negotiated
with the USSR for concessions in the Caucasus. The company
hoped to regain its pre—."ar output and to develop new fields
in this area.*^^ General attention focused on oil concessions,
and these wore among tlie important issues discussed at the
Genoa Conference, which began v/hile NEP was getting under
71. Ibid., pp. P^68-269.
72. mil* Feb. 7» 1922.
way in the Soviet Union. The Journnl carefully reported
the oil debates, sensing that they v/ere a target for
international concern and rivalry, v;hich would inevitably
involve the United States. For example, Britain's rep-
resentative at the Genoa meetings, Lloyd George, had
attempted by direct agreement with the Russians, to obtain
an oil monopoly for the Royal Dutch-Shell Company, Krassin, ^
Soviet Commissary for Foreign Trade, also a delegate at
Genoa, emphatically denied that the contract signed with
the abovcmontioned Shell Company in any v;ay constituted
an oil monopoly. It was, he argued, a 'selling* contract,
by which the company and the Soviet government arranged a
partnership for soiling oil on a fifty-fifty basis, with
divided profits. This altercation led Krassin to encourage
Standard Oil Company to apply for a concession. Eventually,
it succeeded. By the agreement, Standard Oil became part ovmer
in largo oil properties in the Baku region of Russia.
Another beneficial Americm contract was that made between
the International Barnsdall Corporation and the trans-Cauc-
asian states for rights to develop natural resources and
handle all products, particularly in the Baku area. The
hold on these contracts, "TTowever, was tenuous and could
73. ^J.^. ^^^-y 3. 1922.
7^. W^. r.^ay 13f 1922.
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be v/ithdrav/n instantly by the Soviet government. Investing
in such a project eculd bo costly, therefore, and involved
considerable risk. For instance, :2oviet officials ordered
the Barnsdall Corporation to halt all dril] ing operations
in 192^. ' Nevertheless, opportunity for contact and
contract now existed on a fairly finn basis and many American
firms, hoartene^^ by the initial success of their pace-
settin,"; compatriots, took advantage of this. Zinovicv,
representing Lenin at the 1^2.2> Con^munlst Congress, mentioned
460 concessions applicants, of whom 56 v;ere Am.crican. He
further reported that concessions had already been granted
to 26 of the American contingent.
Drawbacks existed, but the majority of contracts
apparently were honored by both sides. If not, then the
Jourral failed to report them. One of the most valuable
American concessions was that gained by the Harriman group.
This consisted of a 20 year manganese mining concession,
centered in the Tchiatori beds in Georgia. The JoMrrcd
de3ightedly claimed this as a gain at the expense of the
Germans, since the latter had absorbed ^2% of the exports
during their exploitation of the beds, the American share
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then being only
7^;. wr.T, April 8, 1922} Oct. 11, 192^^
76. il'ril, Mny 23. 19?-3.
77. "HZl. Doc. 31. 192/I-.
Many American trade unionists shared big businesses
ambiguity over relations with the Soviet Union. There v;ere
some, like the vociferous Samuel Gompers, v/ho steadfastly
rejected economic lirJcs of any kind and v/ho regarded the
Soviet government as treacherous and brutal. Others, what-
-
ever their private feelings, may have been willing to
attempt economic cooperation, as were many businessmen.
The Amalgamated Clothing V/orkers Union, for example,
endeavoured to enter Soviet markets by forming the Russian-
American Industrial Corporation. This project was engineered
and the concession obtained by, Sidney Hillman, the union's
president. Capitalisation for this venture was set at
$l,000,000t 7 cloth factories and 2 cotton mills were to
be operated in Moscow and Petrograd. Hillman expected a
yearly turnover of $40,000,000 and the profits were to be
divided between the Soviet government and the Corporation,
according to the investment made by each. A former presid-
ent of the American Cotton Company, William C. Thompson,
was employed to see that business and building arrangements
were carried out efficiently. Although the Corporation was
ostensibly formed to assist Russian reconstruction, the
53
iJj221IX.zL firmly reminded its readers that the nev/ ventijrc
would not bo run "philanthropical] y" t but rather, for
78the " Gtockholderc "benefit." Guch a statement shov.'s
that former hopes that the Soviet system v/ould speedily
disintegrate were fadin{^ .?nd being replaced v/ith more
concrete, realistic aspirations.
Which fim^s rejected or abandoned trade relations
for ideological or other reasons? Unfortunately, the
Jnurr.?.! yields no information. The i r^ea of a considerable
and lucrative Russian market remained and conceivably
induced American businessmen to exam.ine the possibilities.
No reports of small firms taking part in the concessions
policy have been found, presumably because they could
not supply the capital requirements of the Soviet Union.
A further inducement to big business could have been the
fact that by 192^W a number of countries had officially
recognised the Soviet Union. These included Britain,
France, Italy, Norway, Austria, Greece and Sv;cden. Thus,
as E.M.Miller, statistician to the National Bank of Commerce
in Now York, pointed out, emphasis had shifted from Russian
politics to Russian business. American businessmen might
78. i/SJ:.June 9f 1922.
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have felt the need to enter Soviet markets in order to
keep out undesirable competition. Mr. Miller v;as pessim-
.
istic about the future of American-Russian trade. Commenting
that commerce with Russia v.'as of small importance to over-
all US exports before he could see little in Soviet
economic policies which would improve this situation,'''^
This dismal prophecy v/ast fortunately, unfulfilled. It
is true that the rise in US-Soviet trade was hardly meteoric,
but there was a steady increase, especially from I929-I93I.
Such relations as individual firms did have with their
government's official enemy cannot always be measured in
dollars and cents, or in import and export figures. There
is, even in the bleak and uninformative trade reports of
the Journnl and in some business magazine literature, a
firm realisation that the problem of the Soviet Union
would have to be tackled by other methods than physical
suppression, as in the Civil War period, or by simply
ignoring it, as in the policy of non-recognition.
7Q E.M.Miller, "Place of Russia in International Trade,"
IilSiZMWi:.,VI, 192^. pp. 3-15. For USA/USSR trade
figures, see Appendix B.
-57-
Many American buGiness^non may h:ivo had their
idoac; of Russia and thon the Soviot State formed, modified,
and altered by one or other of the trading: orf^anications
v/hich facilitated trade between the tv/o countries. This
is (at the moment) difficult to prove, but a survey of those
or^^anisations and some of their members will, at leant, show
that '^.merican businessmen and bankers did not operate in a
complete vacu\im. The non-reco,r^ition policy of the American
government did not prevent Russia from establishinp; trade
orp;anisationG in America, nor from operating-; through
individual American companies in a v;ay denied the United
States in the Soviot Union. These organisations and the
opportunities for contact they offered, may have fostered
mutual understanding, between the two nations. Certain it is
that many American companies availed themselves of the
services those bodies offered, thereby extendin,'^ commercial
links with the Soviet Union.
Two of the earliest tradin/^ corporations in this
period were the Russian Information Bureau and the American-
Russian Chamber of Commerce, both founded in I9I6. Their
professed aim wns to foster trade and promote pood economic
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and coir.morcial relations botwoen the United States and
Russia. For this reason, personnel v/as dravm from political,
industrial, and financial circles. The Bureau initially
included Russian government officials and representatives
from the All-Zerastvos Union, an association of local gov-
ernment advisory bodies established in Russia in the late
«
801860*s. From the political world came the redoubtable
ex-president Theodore Roosevelt, and business and banking
were represented by the heads of som.e of the loading
8
1
industrial and financial concerns. The sheer involvement
of these men in all aspects of the business world shows
that they have a substantial claim to be regarded as
leaders in their respective vocations. For example, Edward
Nash Hurley, originated and developed the pneumatic tool
industry in the United States and Europe. From July 191? -
until July 1919 he was simultaneously chairman of the
United States Shipping Board and President of the Emergency
Fleet Corporation. Ke rose to be a director of the Chamber
of Commerce of the United States and president of the
«
American Manufacturers Export Association. His interest
80/ George F. Kennan, Th- rr-ip;9-. Tntorvcn? ( Princeton.
New Jerseyi Princeton University Press, 1953) vol.11,
pp. J22-'}2J, .
81. For a list of the members of the Russian Information
Bureau, see Appendix C.
-59-
in foreign trade is revealed by his membership of the
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and his involve-
ments as a director, in the National Foreign Trade Council.
Another member of the Bureau, Charles Albert Coyle was a
financier and manufacturer. His offices included presidency
of the General Electric Company from its origin until
June 1913* and chairmanship of the Board until May, 1922.
Most 6f the other members of the Bureau were similarly
engaged in business or finance, particularly three men
involved with the commercial life of New York City. The
first, Darwin Poarl Kingsley, was a life undervrriter. He
rose to be president of the New York Chamber of Commerce
in 1920-1921, and became chairman of the Board of the New
York Life Insurance Company in 1931,^-^ The second, Charles
Hamilton Sabin, was a banker and director of numerous com-
panies. He was president of the National Copper Bank of New
York, 1907-1910, vice-president of the Mechanics and Metals
National Bank I9IO, and rose to chairmanship of the board
in 1930. He was also president of the Guaranty Trust Com-
pany, as listed in the Appendix. The third, Jacob Henry
Schiff, not only had varied financial interests but also
Rp. Who V,'^'^ Who in AT,oric:i . (Chica.^ Illinoisi The A.N.




personal interests in Russian affairs. Born in Germany in
13'l7, he eventually came to America and married Theresa
Loeb. This v/as for him a significant step, since Kuhn, Loob
and Company was one of the well-established banking con-
cerns in the City. Schiff soon became a partner in the
firm, as well as holding directorships in three companies,
the Central Trust, Western Union Telegraph and Wells Fargo.
Schiff s interest in Russia did not stem primarily from a
desire to increase financial contact, but rather from a
deep-seated conviction that he, as a Jew, should do all in
his power to assist Russian Jews. In the early 1900* s,
Schiff had been spending his own money to help Russian
pogrom victims and when the Russo-Japanese war of 19d
broke out, he did even more. Japan went to great lengths
to justify her actions to the world, and this entailed -
assisting Russian Jews. Jacob Schiff was gratified and
impressed, and to spur the Japanese to greater efforts,
he floated a $25 million loan for the Tokyo government.
Other loans granted by Schiff amounted to $200 million
and were thus responsible for subsidizing half the war
effort against Russia. His continued efforts on behalf
85. UlLd.
-61-
of Russian Jews v/ore dcterininod and even embarassinc to
the administration of Theodore Roosevelt. It v;as Schiff
who founded the National Coininittee for Relief of Sufferers
by Russian MassacreSf and his efforts helped raise over $1
8
^
million to aid Russian Jev;s. A man v/ith such connections
and such intorects as Schiff would therefore be an obvious
choice for a Russian Information Bureau. Another Bureau
member, v/ho also v/orkcd in New York, was Oscar Straus,
sppointod chairman of the Public Service Commistion in
1916. V/hethor ho had any personal interest in Russia is
difficult to establiiih., but he must have acquired useful
economic and trading knov;lodco since he had served as
87
Roosevelt's Secretary of Commerce ani Labor from I906-I9C9.
Slight acknowedgement was given to professions other than
that of finance. Apart from Theodore Roosevelt, there v/ere
only two other members whose main interest v;as not finance.
One was Lawrence Fracer Abbott, president of tlic The Outlook
[publishing Company, from I89I until 19''^3. Ho did have soL.e
financial interests however, being a trustee of the New York
Life Insurance Company from I9I8 until 1931. v/hen he became
secretary of that body. He knew Theodore Roosevelt fairly
86 Arthur W . Thompson k Robert A. Hart, TIi^lJIpj:!!^
(Amhernt. Mans! t UnWersity of Massachusetts Press, 1970),
r.r> ^.h 72-7/4. 10':-106, 11/^-116.
University of Massachusetts Press, 19£8) pp.
133-13'*.
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welli since the latter v/rote for Ontlcok . Abbott had alco
edited Rooseve3.t*s African and European Addresses and v;aS'
to be author of a book entitled IinTresGionG of Thecdr>r(=>
88Roosevelt , v/ritten in 1919- The seond member was Dr.
Nicholas Murray Butler, v/ho spent most of his v/orking life
as president of Columbia. His broad range of interests»
especially in international affairs, must have made him
89
a most useful member of the Bureau. ^ Although no direct
link can be proved at the moment, betv/oen the Bureau's
activities and the eventual official recognition of the
Svoeit Union, it is possible that such a group of men,
over a period of time, could influence effectively the
opinions of reluctant businessmen and stubborn politicians.
The second organisation founded in I9I6 was
the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce. Its counter-
part, the Russian-American Chamber, had been established
in Moscow under the chairmanship of the Russian indust-
rialist, N.I. Cuchkov. The American Chamber was composed
of financiers and businessmen from nearly 50 .major
manufacturing and financial institutions interested
in
trading with Russia. Its president was Reeve
Schley, a
Marquis Co.,
-S^^'Vpi^S^. (New York: Dell
Publishing Co., Inc., 1963).
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vice-prcGidont of Chase National Bank, one of the major
institutions financing US-USSR trade. It later became
a powerful lobby in the campaign- for recognition of the
Svoiet Union, and resumption of full trade with credits.
The Chamber's attitude towards the USSR was, on the whole,
one of optimism and it gave a realistic appraisal of the
current economic situation. Official government policy
was viewed with disfavor, since it did little to facilitate
trade between the tv:o countries. Nor did the Chamber hes-
itate to give voice to its dissatisfaction with government
policy. For example, the Chamber, in a statement to the
Secretary of State in 1922, asked under what conditions the
Department v/ould agree to accelerating American-Soviet
commerce. As a pressure point, it emphasized that American
failure to capture Soviet m.arkets would leave a void which
90
would be filled only too willingly by Germany, ^ This
representation had no success, but it is indicative of the
seriousness with which leading American businessmen and
bankers viewed the American - Soviet situation.
Two other organisations should he mentioned here.
The first is the Committee of Commerce and Marine, appointed
on, Hf^orrT^ F. Knnnnn. TV|» Dncinion t^^ Tntorven£» (Princeton,
New Jersey I Princeton University Press, 1958) vol. II,
pp. 323-324? Antony Sutton, V/osto rn To ohno l.QJi^LJilli] .^OY ict
g^np_..n.^o P,-.v.-|o-pnrnt. 1017-1.9'^.0. ( California. Stanford
Univa-rsity Press, Hoover Institution Publications, I9t>b),
pp. 289..
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the annual convention of the American Bankers Ag^^oc-
iation in 1919. Robert F. Maddox, president of the latter
body and of the Atlanta National Bank, chaired the first
committee meeting. The purpose of thin fiftoon-man
committee
, composed of come of the leadin^^ bankers,
was to gather ideac and to decide policy on fore\3n, iric\ud\rvcj
Soviet^ trade. The committee also intended to make recomm-
endations to Congress, supporting enlarged and official
trade relations, hence the need for influential and outspoken
members.
The second of these organisations founded in I9I9,
was the American Commercial Association, which aimed at
promoting trade with Russia. It was established by a group
of American manufacturers (representing over 100 firms)
and included members of the Le High Machine Company, Eebroff
Foreign Trading Company, Now Hide Manufacturing Company,
Fairbanks Company, and the Morris Company of Chicago. As one
of its first goals, the association called for removal of
restrictions on financial restrictions with the USSR. Not
satisfied, the president; Emerson P. Jennings, visited the
Soviet Union in 1921 to examine the situation firsthand.
Ql. WSJ: Jan. 22, 1919* For list of mombgrs, see Appensix
E.
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Not unGxpoctedly, he returned disillusioned and wrote a
strong condemnation of Soviet rule. After this development,
emphasis returned to the internal American scene and the
need to extend American-Soviet business facilities. Jennings
frequently urged the United States government to advance : •
credits to the Soviet Union for the benefit of American
manufacturers. "
These organisations are indicative of the intense
American business interest in the Soviet Union and the
efforts made to reopen trade relations. It is difficult
to establish direct links between organisations, but there
was some overlap in membership. From the Appendices it can
be seen that Messers. McRoborts and Kingsley v;ere both
members of the Russian Information Bureau and the American-
Russian Chamber of Commerce} Donald V.'ing belonged to the
latter and to the Committee on Commerce and Marine; Charles
Sabin belonged to all three bodies. Thus, there were opp-
ortunities fcr exchange of useful material and comparison
of trading prospects among members of these various groups.
Moreover, several of these men represented companies
which
had had commercial relations with Russia before
the Revol-
287-
ty» hoover ±ns ou o^uii , -
289.
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ution and v/hich were still trying to maintain contact.
Their cxpcrisnco v/ith Russian methods v.'ould have been
useful and may have partially accounted for the membership
overlap. By no means did all the firms represented come
from Nov/ York City, although they may have maintained offices
there.- Thus, although the hub of American-Soviet trade
and commercial activities v.-as Nev/ York City, business
concerns and their representatives from all over the United
States were involved in these operations.
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The year 192^ w^in a turning point in Anericsn-
f^oviot tradG relations, for it was during this year that
Amtorg, one of the most important and influential trading
organisations, was formed. Slowly improving trade between
the two countries probably influenced its foundation. For
example, American exports to the Soviet Union rose from
$2^1.6 million in 1913* to $^l2.1 million and $68,9 million
in 192^ and I925 respectively.^^ On the Soviet side,
the continuation of MEP kept demands for American goods
at s high level. Also, United States businessmen had been
heartened by the rcoctablishment of the Russian State
Bank in 1921, and the attempt to produce a stable monetary
system. As a result, a nev/ currency, chevroncts bank notes,
vas issued in 19-2 and the demise of the old currency set
for May 10, 192^. Am.erican bankers, thus feeling consider-
ably more secure, begsn to cooperate with the Soviet State
Bank. Five banking concerns, including the Guaranty and
Equitable Trust Companies, and the Public National Bank,
all of Now York City, agreed to act as agents for the
State Bank of the USSR. So, despite what the New York
93. See Appendix B, no. 1.
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nm^' catasorised as "lugubrious" State Department
warnings, and the government's continued refusal of
recognition, banking and business concerns gathered
momentum. The Xi:?.7^ highlighted those aspects of US-
USSR relations which were of special interest to business-
men. An important inducement to trade, in its opinion,
was the grov/ing Russian market i the Soviet Union had
been
-pending $^0 million for American cotton, while
American firms had shipped 1000 farm tractors to the USSR.
The newspaper welcomed this improved situation, and urged
businessmen to continue their efforts, and to ignore
their government's official attitude. For, as it astutely
pointed out, "political formalities" counted "for little,
with such a market. "^^ Like many businessmen, the Timns
regarded ideological differences between the two countries
as something extraneous to the business world. Consequently,
it refused to arbitrate between the capitalist and comjnunist
position on the Soviet Union's resumption of the gold
standard, "Whichever interpretation was correct, argued the
Times did not "alter the fact that Russia's businessmen
9^. The New York Tires will hereafter be footnoted NYT and
referred to in the text as the The Times has been
used here and in the following pages almost exclusively,
since the Journal contains no substantive reference to the
new organisation, not docs it possess detailed accountcf of
the continuing progress of American-Soviet trade during
this period.
95. NYT, Nov. 16, 192^K
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and ours" could "do business on a considerable scale. "^^
It was in such a favorable business and commerc-
ial climate that Amtorg v;as formed. Amtorg, essentially a
consolidation of Arcos America Inc. and the Products
Exchange Corporation, was organised according to New York
State law and capitalised at $1,000,000. Its main function
was to act as the exclusive representative in the United
Statss, of the Russian Gostorg, or State Export and Import
Department. It was also the sole representative of Arcos
Ltd, of London, the selling and buying agent for the Soviet
government in Great Britain. In 1924, both sides were rep-
resented on Aratorg's board of directors by T^essers. Hoorgin
(Chairman) and Ziev (President) for the Soviet Union and
by one Mr. Ohsol, for the United States.^' The ManupJ. for
Soviot-ATrericnn Trndinr: defined the Amtorg Trading Corp-
oration as the "agent for most of the foreign trade organ-
isations of the USSR in transacting and carrying out op-
erations connected with the import of goods from the USSR
into the US and with the export of goods from the US
to the USSR. " ^® Forwarding agents and shipping brokers
were the Deutsch-Russiche Transport Geselschaft, or "Deruta",
96. Hll,.. Nov. 16, 1924.
98*. John*E. Felber, Mr^m^^l for ^nvi ot«Americ^n Trnd i r.g *
(Newark, New Jersey: International Intertrade Index,
1967)» P.29.
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in which W. A,Harriraan and the Hamburg-American line had
50% control, the other half passing to the Soviet Union.
Amtorg's formation exemplifies the growing contact between
American and Soviet commercial and financial authorities.
Amtorg increasingly acquired the role of a commercial
"clearing-housG" for trading and industrial contracts.
Prior to Amtorg* s formation, for example, the All Russian
Textile Syndicate bought its cotton through the Chase
National Bank of New York.^^ After 192^^, Amtorg took over
the responsibility for exporting cottonj agricultural
machinery, electrical supplies and leather goods, and
importing flax, furs and ore. Chairman Isaiah Hoorgin
confidently predicted that America could easily and
profitably acquire a Russian market. Indicative of the
possibilities, in his opinion, v/as the Russian purchase
of $35,000,000 to $40,000,000 worth of American cotton. •
He implied, as had previous business articles since 19l7t
that a large Russian market awaited American traders.
Perhaps as an incentive to hesitant American businessmen,
Hoorgin declared that this new corporation could easily
exceed the $1,000,000 monthly trade average of the twov.
99.ILn:f June 19f 1924.
"
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concerns which had heon merged to form Amtorg.
The extent to which Amtorg's activities were
reported in the press reveals its v/ide connections with
American business and the recurrent ideological problems
it posed for others and faced itself. An example of its
commercial dealings can be given from a trade report
by Leon Talmy, director of Amtorg's Information Bureau.
This document shov;ed that , in 192'+, America hs.d cent a large
export of tractors and cotton to the Soviet Union and
had granted six month credit facilities to expedite trade.
For its part, the Soviet Union had permitted its Oil Trust
to trade through Amtorg, and had sent A. P. Scrobrovsky,
president of the Azerbaijan Oil Trust to the United States
101
to study American oil-refining methods. Despite these
hopeful signs, the Tirr.oG was careful to steer a middle
course between undue optimism and unnecessary pessimism
regarding US-USSR relations as a whole. The truism that
businessmen were notoriously conservative and would thus
hesitate before becoming deeply involved in Russian affairs,
although modified, still merited attention. A Wall Street
representative; concerned at the apparent apathy of some
100, mit J^r^s i9» 192^.
101. nxHf ^ov. 16, 192^^.
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businessmen, openly accuced the government of leaning
over "backwards to prevent /unericans dealing with Russia,
V
It was obvious that many business and financial concerns
would feel apprehensive about making contact with the
Soviet Union, fearing possibly that official disapproval
might reveal itself in other ways. Consequently, an "offic-
ial" as opposed to a "personal" view was expressed on
trading possibilities. For example, a representative
of one of the Trust com.panies, who was also the New York
agent for the Soviet Eank, told the TlTr.os that ho "offici:illy"
advised customers that they traded at their own risk. His
ov;n feelings were that Soviet trade was no more hazardous
than that of many other countries. He considered the danger
of the Soviet Union defaulting to be minimal, since it know
that any credit facilities received wore dependent upon
102
a stable financial cystem . His point was well made,
for the procurancc of American credit proved a constant
source of anxiety for the Soviet Union, despite the fact
that it did not default on payments.
There were other sources of potential influence
on businessmens* behaviour towards American-Soviet trade.
i02. m"., Nov. 16, I92.i\,
t
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In an Outlook article, headed "Business v/ith the Eolsheviki"
Stanley High firmly declared that the NEP was "not comm-
•
unism". He discerned several indications that the Soviet
Union was "prepared to malte many of the necessary concess-
ionions to private, trade. " ^ Later, in Nation* Harry F. Ward,
head of the Methodist Federation for Social Service,
cautiously argued that NEP in no v/ay indicated that the
Soviet Union had given up its hostile attitude towards
private trade. Ward stated that he had even tried to
evaluate the situation from a Soviet viev.-point, but could
only come to the conclusion that the Russians were willing
to move slov/ly towards their economic aims. NEP, therefore,
did not represent a total change of policy, at least in
Ward's opinion, merely an adjustment which could ultimately
be used to fulfill previous communist claims. He acknow-
ledged that this policy did not conform to the tem.po of
the profit-making system, but declared that as long as the
Soviet government v/as satisfied with the country's pro-
gress; there would be "no return to private capitalism."
The Soviet Union, reasoned Ward, was clearly moving in
the opposite direction.
^^'^ The 'differences in these two
103. Outlook , Dec. 10, 1924, pp. 592-4
104. Nation . July 8, 1925, PP- 64-6?.
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opinions, represent the confusion into v;hich American
businessnien and business cor.entators were thro\vn, by the
Soviet adoption of ITEV, Professor Peter Filene has
adequately demonstrated the misinterpretation and mis-
understanding of American capitalists on this sub ject. '^'^^
Although individual documentation is not readily forth-
coming, it v/ould seem that the majority of businessmen
and bankers favoured the opinion expressed by High. They
honestly believed, and fervently hoped, that NEP v/ould
move the Soviet Union closer to the kind of capitalist
and profit oriented system of the United States, Moreover,
since capitalism and civilisation v;ere sjTionj'mous to most
American businessmen, their reaction to riEP, (v/hich they
understood to be a negation of commiunism) can more easily
be appreciated. Tv/o other factors motivated the comjnercial
world to consider the USSR as a serious business propositioni
first, the perennial lure of Russian markets, and second,
the belief that the more contact Soviet officials had with
the V/ost, the more they might be influenced avray from
communism. Professor Filene has already pointed to the
American mistake of putting too much emphasis on the "retreat"
105. Peter Filene, /-ncric-ns q t.^ the Soriot ?:xpcr;n'r'nti 1917
--
tQ?3 . (Crjnbridge, Mass,, Harvard University Press, 19b7)
pp. 103-105.
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and too little on the "strategic" in response in response
to Lenin's characterisation of NEP as a "strategic retreat."^
Mention has previously been made of the "official" and
"personal" reactions businessmen might alternatively
express on US-IJSSR trading . relations. These "public"
and "private" attitudes persisted. A Nation editorialf
headed "Russia in Wall Street", supported the attempts
at economic rrpTrochoment , and in doing so, referred to
this dual attitude. The editorial claimed that "v;hile
the business world as a v:hole has maintained its suspicions
of the terrible Bolsheviki, here and there experimenters
have entered on pioneer path of friendly and normal trade
relations.
"^^"'
The progress of Amtorg itself is indicative of
the vddening trading interests betv;een the two countries
and indirectly, of a willingness to submerge political
differences and concentrate on commerce. 1925f ^or example,
saw the acceleration of agricultural machine shipments to
the Soviet Union. One such shipment, amounting to $2,000,000
was arranged through Amtorg and sent to the Blade Sea ports.
The Yuba Manufacturing Company of San Francisco obtained
106. Ibid. , p. 109.
,
107. N'-t.jon . Oct. 21, 1925. P. ^53.
108. NYT . March 2k, I925.
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through Aratorg, a contract for $1, 200,000 v;orth of elec-
trically driven mining dredgers for the Ural Platinum
Trust an important concession in manganese, a necessity
for the steel industry, was obtained by tho W.A. Harriman
group. ''^ Most of the contracts were large, both in quantity
and cost, and many proved mutually beneficial. Amtorg's
chairman, Isaiah Koorgin enthur^iastically reported a $1,000,
000 turnover for 1924-25, and forsaw increased Russian
expenditure in America because of the rapidity of Soviet
111
reconstruction and the need for tools and equipment.
That Amtorg and its operations v;ere respected,
can be seen by the kind of business concerns that chose
to work with it. This fact had greatly impressed an edit-
orial writer of the Nntion. who made special mention of
the fact that no "outside speculators and concessions
hunters" were opening trading contracts with the USSR. .
On the contrary, he concluded that the several
incursions
into the Soviet market were made by the familiar
and
well-established business and financial bodies, like
the
Guaranty Trust Company, the Equitable Trust
Company and
the Irving Bank-Columbia Trust Company.
Mention was also
109. IlXt» April 18, 19'-5
110. mit J^i^e 16, 1925
111. KLlt June 2, 1925*
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made of the large investments, particularly by the Chase
Manhattan Bank and the Equitable Trust Company. ^-^ Prof-
essor Antony Sutton has also categorised the aforementioned
financial houses as being leaders in the Soviet credit
113business. Something more of Amtorg's effectiveness in
softening US-USSR economic relations, can be seen in the
Times ' s report of a tragedy that befell the trading company
in August, 1925. Chairman Hoorgin and a Soviet representat-
ive, George Slankey, were drowned in Long Lake, New York
City, The Timos * s obituary was informative, and cordial in
tone. It sketched Hoorgin* s early life as a Polish Jew,
and his activities since 1921, when he became a member
of the Soviet Legation in Warsaw. From this point, he had
increasingly involved himself in Russian economic policy.
HooTgin was credited with Amtorg's phenomenal rise in
business* from its 192^ capitalisation of .$1,000,000
to,j$50, 000,000 in one year. The Tines also praised his
"proverbial courtesy" and gave the impression that American
1 14
businessmen in general, liked and respected him. There
is nothing extraordinary about this obituary. Nevertheless,
112. lintian, Oct. 21, 1925, p- ^53.
113. Antony Sutton, v/r-^t^-pn Teohrolop:v nnd rcviot EcomiDXe.
PQVolo pment. loi7-T0?0 . (California, Stanford University
Pren^s, Hoover Institution Publications, 1968),pp. 289.
11^+. mi, Aug. 28, 1925? Sept. 13» 1925.
-78-
it illustrates the fact that Soviet representatives were
beginning to be treated and judged as individuals, and
that ideological differences could be excluded. The very
fact that ideology v/as not mentioned was some evidence
of the importance of American-Soviet trade, and showed
an almost conscious desire not to rupture the advancing,
but alv;ays delicate, trade relatfohs.
American banl^ing arrangements with the Soviet
Union greatly improved once it became evident that the
Russians could avoid defaulting on credits. One result
was that financial houses such as the Chase National
Bank and the Equitable Trust Company granted more liberal
credits for cotton purchases. The Iim!L£ was quick to
note
this positive reaction and reported "as evidence
of the
increasing Wall Street interest in the Russian
situation,"
that a discussion of further trade possibilities
included
"...some of the most prominent men listed in
the Directory
of Directors.
"^^^ Unfortunately, it did not specify who
these were. However, despite the
Soviet Union's proven
ability to meet all her trade committments,
the pace at
Tif. NYT. Oct. 6,
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which America extended credit facilities did not match
the accGlerated growth in Soviet reconstruction and her
consequent industrial needs. As a result, the USSR turned
to Europe, v/here the Germans in particular, offered credit
on preferable terms. Some ^:20 millicn worth of Soviet
busine.ss had been diverted to Germany from the United States,
for this reason. Other European countries also benefited
from American reticence in credit donation. J. A. Poliakoff,
an Amtorg representative, complained that the "whole credit
business" was the real stumbling block to sv/ift and increas-
ed trade, Ke confessed that the American autobus v/as superior
in quality to that of British Leyland, but the latter*
s
credit offer was more generousj .tecrican manufacturers
could only offer a few months credit, v;hile Leyland offered
two years. Poliakoff maintained that the Soviet Union
was "still too poor to pay cash for American goods when
1 1 £
European countries" offered "long credits."""
~ Nevertheless, American-Soviet trade increased,
as many including the new chairman of Amtorg, Saul G.Ercn,
forsaw. Credit difficulties notwithstanding, important
116. mx^ May 23, I926.
80
contractc for Aniorican farm machinery, tools of all
descriptions; automobiles, tractors, and all manner of
factory equipment v/ero obtained throuch the offices of
Amtor^^ The foundation of this trading corporation was a
significant step in the progress of trade relations.
Some such official body was necessary to demonstrate to
businessmen that good faith was possible on both sides,
and that commercial contracts could be honored, despite
the inhibiting factor of conflicting political ideologies.
Also, Amtorg was useful in that it gave American business-
men an opportunity to meet with Soviet trade representat-
ives and to discuss pressing matters at first hand.
Gradually, therefore, businessmen could accustom themselves
to Soviet bargaining practices and arguments, something
which many diplomats and politicians did not enjoy until
after 1933- By the early 1930' s, so much progress had been
made that not only were American goods going to the Soviet
Union, but also American manpower, in the form of technician
and industrialists of all kinds.
£]iap.tc.r._6 » AnrirlCiiri-.MELnpower in thp Soviet Unjon
As the 1930 *s progressed and the United States
found itself in the throes of an unprcccdently damaging
economic depression, businessmen v/ho had previously
Bcorned the communist system, nov; gave serious consideration
to tho Five Ycr.r Plan
. The interest in Soviet markets
was developed not so much for the beneficial effect it
was imagined that the USSR would derive from contact
with a successful capitalist system, as for the v;elcome
boost communist economic demands gave to the American '
market. The magnitude of this boost can be seen by the rise
in US exports to the Soviet Union from a value of $8^1 million
in 1929, to million in 1930. '^"^'^ Another area of American-
Soviet business expanded greatly during the 1930 *s and that
was technical assistance. Among the first Americans to leave
for the USSR v/ere technicians from Hugh L. Cooper and Company.
Their services were used in the construction of the Dnieper
River power plant. Colonel Cooper's services were evidently
highly regarded, since ho v/as involved in several conferences
with Stalin himself. The Soviet Union also sent many of
117, See Ap-oendix E, no. 1. „ . . t- ^irr.r.Y,+ 1 ol 7-
V:„v^;!i^^—Moc.^.. Hnrvard University Press. 1967;
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itG own indu::tri:iliEtc to America to study method and
and tochniquc. In l928-29» for example, I33 special
Soviet dolc/^ationa cor.prioin^?: delecations and rep-
resenting every important induotry visited America J' "^^
Saul Eron, one-time chairman of Amtorg's board of dir-
ectors, commented favourably on the rise in number of
individual engineers and foremen rent to the USSR. The
I927--8 figure of ^fOO rose to 800 in I929. ' This did not
include a delegation of nearly 100 American businessmen sent
to the USSR under the auspices of the American-Russian
Chamber of Co:rmerce. Furthermore, in 1928, the Soviet
Republic was visited by representatives of over I50 Americ-
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an firms, many of them loaders in their respective fields.
It is difficult to be precise about the number of American
engineers and technicians employed in Russia at any one
time but Professor Fileno has noted that in 1931 » mo^re than
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1000 Americans were working for the Soviets. What were
tho attitudes of these industrialists and buoinessmon to
the Soviet rystom?
In general, it v;ould seem that, while admiring
the fortitude and persistence of Soviet workers, most of
119„ Saul Bron, Sov^f>t Kcononic T TY^^ lpprngnt r\ n^ Aricr^Pan
T^uiin-rs, (New Yorkt Horace Liveright, 1930 ). PP- ^o-^o




tho cn-ineers and technicians cU-iikod the autocratic mothodn
and pr-ferrcd the ccncu-cr benefitG and civic freedomn of 'the
United Statec. For exa.'^plc, in a ccnvercation between Mr.
John Calder and Walter Duranty, recorded in the magazine^
I^JLLlI^t the forr,er, employed in the USSR with the McKee
Company of Cleveland, wac quoted as having saidt "In America
on a big steel job re know at the start that some of us
won't live to see the finish, tut we have been lucky at
Magnitogorck-hcw }ucky!-and v/e have got the furnaces built
a few days ahead of schedule. I tell you that no engineer
in Aracrica would believe such a job possible with unskilled
labor." This appeared in one of a number of very detailed
articles on the progress of the Soviet Union after the Rev-
olution, printed in F^rt^;rf^ magazine. In fact, they were
printed, as the preface in Fortur.o explained, to try and
combat what that magazine characterised as "American ignorance
on Russia". Not only v/as the diligence of the Russian worker
admired, but the Soviet Five Year Plan itself was lauded as
being better, "in theory at least," than an unplanned econo-
mic system. '^^ Clearly, Fo rtune , one of the most projnincnt
business journals, was inferring that American businessmen
122. FiirlXlli -:^rch 1932, pp. 76 cnwardsi pp. I25-I32.
123. ILLl.
ImlrJ.t cJo v/oTi to o'/'^rrJno Bomo aapootn of a plonnf^d ooonrmy.
The article citlod an im uy.i.inj.h-^ nf t)ir> "profound" chEin''<?B
wrought by tho Plan, tho 700 now nur:r:lan faotorler, r-qnlppod
wltli Ainorican mnr-hi nory. ^ Thin innf^azlno, like nmy othern
of n nlmllar nntiiro, wnn commontlriK undor the pall of the
doprooBlon f nd npparontly failed to noo tho Ircny of tl^.at
lua't Btatement. For nuroly It In Ironic thr.rt a nation
Undrr£;olne
: ^ .> j .I'lnnnclal und commor61nl dlaloodtlon
(;hf)uM bo ablo to nnflnt rrmtorlally tho induntrlpilltiatlan
of nnothnr. Undoubtodly, Ainifrlcnn Induutrioa wore ntlmulntod
by Hunoian ordorr, but thono v/ero hardly BUfflclont to
conqvicr tho offocta of a doprorsnlon, One of tho main rcaoonn
wliy tlio f^ovlct Union proforrod Arnorlcan mnchtnery end other
p;oodr! to thono of Europe was bocauso of tholr cuporlor
quality. Thin J'act In ItnoTf v/afi an Indicator of Auk rl can
ablill.lon. Naturally, fov; AiriMrlcan commentato)i; or lairlnoss-
mon v/(!ri! able Lo vlov/ tho nltuntlon In nnr'h a frrv^urablo
llr.l't, althouA^h mont undoubtodly Ijollnvod that rocovory wac
ponn.l bio.
What of tho quality of Movlot lifo? ]](^r('. tho r;cnoral
OOnfltnuUS was that It waa vory much bolow AmoMcan ntandarda
I
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and had, in fact, made little progress since the Revolution.
The 7.^j:t\\ns. article, for example, conceded that the USSR '
had gained by the Plan in oil, industrialisation and agric-
uture, but asserted that the general living standard had
declined from 1928 to I93O. It acknowledged a rise in I93I,
but 'maintained that the living standard was still below the
1927 levels. Since the article "gave no definition of
what was meant by "levels", the comparisons are useless
i
however, the statement itself is indicative of the general
feeling in American business circles that the Russian people
were paying a great personal price for industrialisation, .
According to the same Fortune article, the Five Year Plan had
so tightened its "ir6n belt" that until 1931 t "only 8% of
Russia's imports could be eaten, v/orn or enjoyed." And then
in graphic tones the article went cn to give an example of
deprivations experienced by the Russian people: ... 1, 500,000
sweet and juicy tangerine s-which Russians would love to eat-
literally were takan by the State out of their watering
mouths last year, and sold abroad." It is not a little
ironic that such' sentences could, be written at a time when
many Americans were enduring overwhelming personal hardships
125. Zcxllim* March 1932, PP. I25-I32.
126. Ibid .
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an the result of deficiences in the economic, industrial
and commercial sectors.
The underlying hostility to Soviet methods of
govemrr.ent apparent in the above statement v.'as reflected
in the testimony of Phillip J. Harty of New Jersey, given
before the House of Representatives Committee on Ways and
Means \n 1931* The Committee was conducting hearings on the
proposed bill to place an American embargo on Soviet goods,
and Harty testified at the request of the initiator of the
embargo bill, William V/illiamson, Representative ' for South
Dakota. Jiarty is an excellent example of the large number
of American engineers who eventually returned to the United
States with a strengthened belief in the capitalist system
and its values.
"^^"^ Representative Williamson introduced Harty
to- the Committee as an engineer v;ho had spent "some consider-
able time in Russia." Williamson also confidently claimed
that Harty was "perhaps more familiar with Russian conditions
...than any other man in this country.
"^^^ This was undoubt-
edly an exaggeration since many engineers had had experiences
similar to those of Harty, but Williamson was required to
—n+hor> pysni>olos are driven in Peter Filcne, ;-rerj„Pnr.r ?.n^
^Jl^-.l^t'l^ltl^^^^ (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard
128 "^^i:^^ ^^^^ ^i ^^ h; ;?ng; before the Committee
. 3rd. onH.R. 16035. (February 19. 20, 21. 1931J
waonm^
D.C.t Government Printing Office. 1931.
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prove his caco in a convincing manner.
In his opening statements to the Committee,
Harty declared that he had been sent to Russia under the
auspices of Amtorg, with which he had signed a contract
to supervise the rolling operations of a mill in one of
the plants of "Stal" in Russia, for a two year period.
Almost all Marty's comparisons between American and Soviet
conditions were invidiouci his only favourable comment v;as
that the younger Russian workers were "enthusiastic" about
their work. Harty appears to have entered the USSR with a
firm idea of what he would find there: hov;ever, his extended
travels did nothing to assuage his earlier convictions.
This was clearly discernible in his testimony, which began:
"The minute I arrived in Russia my impression of the people
was they v/cre like so many thousands of mechanical men,
directed and operated by one great dynamo or electric switch.
No matter v/here one goes he sees poverty and filth, and
this is more noticeable in the snail villages than it is
in the larger cities. During my stay of five or six months
in Russia I did considerable traveling, and I found terrible
conditions every\yhere. I have been in Leningrad. , Moscow,
-88-
Mokoevka, Kharkoff. Meriopul. and Stalin. Run^sia and
KuznotG, Siberia.
.. .From experience in Ruscia, in my
opinion, there are two classes of labor, conscript and
convict. The only difference is that the former receives
a small wage and have to feed themselves, while the latter
are fed by the soviet.
... Living conditions in the small tov/ns
are bad? food ir scarce j workers are dressed in rags. Most
everything saleable that is produced is exported."
In this recital of personal impressions, there
existed little magnanimity. No allowance was made for
the fact that in a twenty year period, from I9OO to I920,
the Russians had endured tv;o devastating wars and a trem-
end ous social,political and economic internal revolution.
The methods of Soviet communism may have boon inferior
to those of a capitalist system in dealing vrith these
internal problems, but the period of the Depression was
hardly the time to so arg^je. V/hat we find in Harty's
testimony, then, is the impactofa first encounter with
what was to become an alien culture. The attitudes and
first impressions of visiting American businessmen and
industrialists and technicians filtered through the
business journals; magazine articles and newspapers, to
130. Uliii.
the AmericD.n reading public, and may have tGon instrum-
ental in ncms small v/ay in bolsterins a waning belief
in the total efficacy of the capitalist systeir.. Despite
the human suffering engendered by the Five Year Flans,
the acl:nov:l edged technical and industrial success of this
economic planning achieved tv/o things: first, it formed
'a-
a background against which /jr.orican failures could be
critically cxaT.inodj second, it provided a spur to the
adventurcuc bucinossman, anxious to expand his markets.
Apart from individual engineers and technicians,
Uiany important American firms became involved in business
deals and contracts v/ith the Soviet Union. These included
V/estinghouse Electric, International Harvester Company,
General Electric and the company which perhaps had the
most impact on Russia, that of Henry Ford. Entitling a
column "Henry Ford conquers Russia", ^:aurice Hindus wrote
enthusiatically of Soviet pride in Fordson tractors.
Quoting IzXJlzll^it Hindus reported that Leningrad metal
and electrical factories had now introduced "fordism" into
their plants. Furthermore, Hindus optimistically wrote, it
was a personal victory for Henry Ford himself t "...Next
to Lenin, Trotsky and Kalinin, Ford is possibly the most
widely known personage in Russia. "''^^ It might seem
incongruous that a capitalist should achieve so much pop-
ularity in a Communist country, tut Professor Nevins has
suggested that the Soviet leaders regarded Henry Ford not
as a capitalist, but as an economic revolutionary."-^
Ford's involvement in Soviet reconstruction, ccmbined with
his predilection for offering opinions on a variety of
subjects, make him' sn admirable example of American business
initiative. Naturally, his attitudes towards the USSR are
not entirely representative of the whole business communityt
they do however, give an insight into the ideas of at least
one important businessman, who not only had contact with
Russia; but also v/as a moulder of American public opinion.
As Professor Nevins has succinctly pointed out,
"The initial relationship was purely commercials Russia
bought and Ford sold." "^^-^ Soviet interest in Ford's
technical assistance occurred in I926. The Ford Company
was invited to send a delegation to the Soviet Union to
examine the servicing of the 20,000 odd tractors in the
country and to begin training Russians to use Ford tech-
niques. Henry Ford accepted and five men were sent to the
111. Th-^ Om-^I-c): , Juno 29, 1927, PP. 280-283.
132. A. Nevins and F. Hill, Forr^t ExDnnsion nnd Chal1/-nrPi 1
1232, (Now Yorkj Charles Scribner's {jons, 1957) P» ^04.
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Soviet Union, including VJilliam G. Collins of the Italian
Ford CoRp2.ny and an ongincor na>'7ied Brsdc H. Eorghoff.
Aftsr extensive travelling and. .investigation, during v;hich
the delegation v;as given anple opportunity to see Fordson
tractors operating on Russian soil, the five technicians
were unimpressed with Soviet managerial talent. Regarding
general industrial methods as inefficient, they decided
not to set up a Ford factory in Russia, since they had
concluded that the Soviet Union was not sufficiently v.'ell
equipped for such an innovation. However, v.'hen Soviet
officials approached the Ford Coripany in 1928, their
efforts met v;ith success. The final contract was signed
by Henry Ford, Valery Meshlauk, vice-chairman of the Supreme
Economic Council, (for the Soviet Union) and Saul G. Bron,
for Amtorg. The agreem.ent included the exportation of
$30,000; 000 v/orth of Ford cars to the Soviet Union and the
construction of a Ford foundry under the auspices of the
Soviet goverrjnent.
This contract involved much more than simply
purchasing machinery. Henry Ford agreed to give the USSR
the rights to make, sell and use Ford machinery; Russian
134. Nil, Jvne 1, 1929? A. Kevins and F.Hill, forrl^ ^yprnnian
PX^ r.y^-i^nrU. (new York: Charles
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engineers were granted accecs to Ar-crican plants; and
Ford's ov.-n engineer::;, it v/a£3 also agreed, v/ould be sent .
to the Caviet Union to help with plant installations
and training. Superficially, this v;ac an extensive
business deal. Underneath, hov;ever, Henry Ford had a
tv;c-fcld ain; as outlined in one of his publications.
«
Firsti he believed that such an action v;ould improve
international relations? second, he v;as convinced that
an advanced nation should be prepared to assist others,
for "industrialisation meant prosperity and prosperity
advanced world peace. "''-^^ For all his desire to assist
Russia industrially, Henry Ford hir.solf v/as in no way
sympathetic tov/ards ccmr.unisin. He abhorred the system
as one v/hich "sought to deny Nature." And it was his
conviction that Nature had, in retaliation, rejected
the USSR. Ford held strong views on the relative positions
of /iincrican and Soviet v;orkers: in comparison to the United
Statesi Che Russian v;orkcr had no individual freedom, and
was treated as a slave. Freedom he defined as "the right
to worlt a decent length of time and to get a decent living
for doing so... it is the aggregate of these and many
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Hailing the superiority of the American's
working conditions over those of his Russian counterpart,
Ford v;as simply echoing the opinions of many of the
American engineers and technicians who visited the USSR.
While i± is difficult to say exactly why Henry Ford
made this and other commercial arrangements with the
Soviet Union, som.e of his statements quoted above reveal
a surprisingly idealistic outlook. Yet it can hardly
"be said that all his ventures v/ere undertaken from either
this or from a profit m.otive. In fact, Ford did not
profit financially from the above-mentioned contract: he
lost $573,000. He had, however, gained an important foothold
in the Soviet market, and the ground v;as laid for future
contracts. By no means all v/as lost, and as Professor
137
Mevins had pointed out, such a deficit was bearable.
The Soviet contract gave Ford an enviable opportunity
to prove that, despite' the current American financial
crisis, capitalism could produce valuable techniques
and quality goods. Moreover, Ford had been able to put
some of his o^Nn ideas into action and the Tj,m?? caught
something of his many-sidedness when it quoted him as
137> A. Mevins and F. Hill, ZordjL.Fxi-:^ ^""^^f^ *ioicr,io33, (New York iCharles Scribner's Sens, 193/;
p. 682-6S3.
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saying, "No matter where industry prospers, v/hcthor in
India, in China or Russia, all the v;orld is bound to
catch some good from it."^-^^
138. NYT. June 1, 1929.
-95-
^]ir? -l-r. 1.030-1 o^->.
The yearn I930-I932 proved to be a tccting period
both for Amtors and for the American businonnmen who traded
v/ith "bhe Soviet Union. Decpite the bonef ic.i nl t':^rov/th in
tradir^contactn by coinpaniea like Ford, countcractinr;
forcer, emorfod durin."^ the early thirties which had unploac-
ant and dobilitatinc effects on American-Soviet trade relat
ionn, In Americat the Wall Street crach and the economic
doprecsion had reinforcod the feeling of beinf threatened
from uithin, v.'hich Americanr? had had since the end of
World War I. Jur.l ar the period covered in thir. thoGis
bee;an with the fear of alienc, an demonstrated in the "Red
Scare", 1:0 it ended v;ith a further out-burst of anti-
Rovictlcm. Thin cuspicion of communism was kindled also
by those who resented the apparent success of the Soviet
Union's Five Year Plan, while the United States suffered
an economic slump. Considerable pressure, therefore, was
brought to boar on business and labor leaders to find the
causes for the nation's economic malaise. In lar;-e part,
this investir:ation sou-ht a scapecoat, and communism
conveniently was hold to be at the root of some of the
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problems. The events of these years were not only import-
ant for their effect on the American business attitude
to the USSR. It can also he argued that they v/ere, in-
directly, partly responsible for bringing American-Soviet
economic relations violently into the foreground, at a
•fcirne when political and diplomatic recognition of the
USSR was being proposed openly in many quarters. The
ro-emergence of a vociferous anti-communist movement
propelled Amtorg, ostensibly an economic organisation,
directly into the political arena, with two significant
results. First, it revealed some of the difficulties
v/hich could arise v;hen there were no suitable diplomatic
channels through v;hich resolution of problems might be
sought. Second, pro-recognitionista wore greatly aided by
Amtorg's eventual vindication both by American govern-
ment officials and businessmen. Thus, publicity had been
given to the 'cause' and a more favourable climate
attained for the consideration of recognition.
At first, the virulent anti-comriiunist campaign
seems incomprehensible. The Depression had made the Soviet
market an attractive one to American businessmen. Persistent
efforts had been made to maintain and expand commercial
contacts , and in 1930» American exports to the USSR had
1
reachod tholr poak,^'^ But no had Soviet oxportr. to the
United States. "^''^ And it was around thic fact that
animoGity grew.
The Soviet, as well as the American, economy-
had been badly nhakon by the Depression. V/orld price
lovc.lc had pluminottod, thus forcin?;; the USSR to incroaco
{greatly its exports in order to maintain ita customary
rate of machinery and industrial purchasoG, Western
nationG, including the United States, desperately beset
with their ovm economic problems, seized upon tliis
Soviet action iir, a useful explanation for their ovm
economic shortcoming's. The Russians wore charged with
attempting to monopolico narkcts and of destroying
competitors; and particularly, by "dumping". The rise
in American-Soviet trade which had been fbrmerl y so
enthusiastically received was now berated by many
American businessmen as an attempt to overthrow
capitalism. Professor Filene h.-s accurately explained
Gomething of the true situation : in reality, many of the
accusations levelled at Soviet policy wore not completely
fair, since a socialist economy operates by methods
139. See Appendix li. No, I.
li^O. See Appendix B, No. 2.
-98-
different from those of a capitalist system. Also the
Russian government was not trying to monopolise markets;
it had been forced to lov;Gr its prices in order to sell
more goods. Hov;ever, each country perceived and inter-
preted these Soviet actions in various v;ays, and mis-
interpretation beca-me the reality of the moment. Further-
more, the arguments becpjne shrouded in ideological warfare
and propagandist terminology. Hostile American business-
men consequently cam.e to consider the economic question
of 'dumping* in a political context. Thus, it is not
enough to point out the ironies and misunderstandings
of this particular situation t one m.ust also follow the
argum.ents of the protagonists in their ov.m v/ords. From
them one can obtain an insight into the hysteria aroused
by the dum.ping accusations and of the hypocrisy that
re suited.
Early in 1930, Amtorg was forced to digress from
the path. of trade and follow that of politics, in a
m.ore
pronounced manner than heretofore. One of the prime
movers
behind this development was Matthew Woll,
vice-president
of the American Federation of Labor,, and
acting president
of the National Civic Federation. Stating'^hls
particular
concern to be the "subversive activities
of Communists"
in tho Unitof3 Stateci ho cin^r^led out Amtorf; for npecial
attention. V/oll charcocl that Amtorf^ v;as a "covor for
Cpranrnnict a^Gnts and propr-gatidints, " ^'^^ He inveighed
againnt thoco "few inductrialistc and commercial men"
who v/ore tradinr; with the Soviet Union. These men, having
been "beguiled by Coviot economic concescionn and prompted
by tlio desire of private profit and exploitation of
Rucsian re::ourconf " wore advocating rocogriition. Thin
V/oll oppoced, I^loreovor, ho demanded eradication of nuch
noxious contaetr: by means of a trade embargo on the Soviet
I'll
Union, The nttackc on Amtorg and the rcquentn for an
embargo were to continue intermittently for the next tv/o
yearn.
When called before a Congrecsional Committee
inventigatin?:; Communicm in the United Statec, Well castig-
ated the government for jeopardising the safety of the
state i for the sake of "helping American corporations
do b-a-inoss with Russia." lie considered that the hoover
Admin;iGtration had been "too lenient with Amtorg officials"
who should be carefully watched and prdferab,ly banned
from -the country.
^''^ Well was supported by the chairman
1^0. Lin:, March 1930
141. Ibjji.
1^12. j^iYl. July 12, 1930
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of
-the Committee, Hamilton Fish, Congressman of New York,
who saw no reason why Russians should be "allowed the
hospitality of our free country" simply because they spent
money in the United States . Woll warned American capital-
ists that in trading v/ith the Soviet Union they were "sett
up n Frankenstein " which would "some day come to plague
them." ^ Much of V.'oll's testimony had the aura of crude
sensationalism about it and he admitted that he could
not point to any specific Communist activities -of which
he disapproved. He believed it was the administration's
duty to discover them.
Some American businessmen were prepared to
support V/oll's speculations and accusations with facts.
For example, the president of the American Manganese Prod-
ucers Association, John Carson Adkerson, called for an
embargo on Soviet manganese. Besides the now familiar
accusation of 'dumping', Adkerson used what was to become
a principle argu.ment for the imposition of an embargo
i
the so-called 'slave labor' in Soviet industry. Slave
labor, Adkerson maintained, enabled Russia to produce
manp-anose ore more cheaply than American dealers, thereby
143. iDid .
creating unfn.ir competition. The USSR's manganese price
was $26 per tcin, as against the American price of $3^1-
per ton. Predictably, Amtorg's representatives denied
the accusations. The president of Rudo-Export, the ore
exporting corporation of the USSR, argued that the United
States Steel Corporation and Bethlehem Steel had used
manganese from the Chiaturi mines since 1.886, "because
American output v.'as insufficient to meet the demands of
the steel industry. He pointed out that the United States
required 800,000 tons of ore a year but only produced
'^6,000 tons. This need alone, he contended, would disprove
the accusation of dumping and unfair competition. Moreover,
the Soviet ore president argued that, since Russian mangan-
ese was sold on long-term contracts, dumping could hardly
be involved. '^^^ Two members of Amtorg, J.Eudish and S.
Shipman took the Times to task for its statement that
Soviet manganese v/as about to "strangle an infant industry".
How they asked, could irports totalling half of one per cent
of total production harm or destroy American industry?
To support their argument, they stated that manganese
was not an "infant industry"! American production had begun
Ikn, ELlf J^ly 26, 1930
K^Bi^dJch anfs.S. Shipman, Znxl^^^J^^^
(New YorkJ Horace Liveright, Inc. 1931; P- '^"^^
as early ac I832. As for tho direct 'dumping ' charges,
Budish and Sh5,pmr.n argued that the American Anti-Duiriping
Act of 192? had defined dumping as Rolling merchandise
at loEG than itc fair value (as tabulated by the foreign
marl;ct value ). Since, they continued, the prices of
Soviet ore in other countries v.-ere less than those in the
United States, the USSR could not be accused of unfair
1/17
pr5 CO fixing. '
Nor wore they any less critical of American
attcr.pts to establish a pulp'.vood embargo, According to
Budish and Shipman, American imports of one eighth of
one por cent of the domestic consumption coold not
possibly harm domestic output. Furthermore, the only
Soviet lumber exported to the United States v/as spruce,
v;hich v/as scarce in America. Even then, they maintained,
it was sold at higher prices than American spruce of
1 8domestic production or that imported from Canada*.
They found corroboration for this contention in the
otatoment of H.ll. Oxholm, Director of the Lumber Division
of the .U.S. Department of Commerce. In a letter to the
New York Lumber Trade Association, dated April 18, 1930i
147.11:11., pp. 'f2-'^9.
ms.ihisL., pp. 72-74.
Oxholm donJod tii-it tho Ruaaianr. wore undornolUng tholr lum-
ber. In fact, more monDy had boon paid for Soviet lumber
than for almllar kinds from ©astorn Canada. In hio opinion,
Soviet lumber clid not come into direct competition with
American wood,^^*^
Amoi-ican bunlnoBB opinion wan divided on the
IrBue of dumping, but .-it the outret t}io accucorc v;ore
more vociferous than the dofendern. The Tiin^H foarod
for the health of American markotcj Accintant Gecrotary
of the Troarury, f:;A;ymour Lovmnn or.^'^god in bitter alter-
cations with Peter Bof^danov, Chairman of Arntor^?;j American
iranganoEo producers ropoatcdly dompnddd an embargo. As if
to liif^hlit^ht the intonno Gucpicion into which Amtorg
had fallen, Federal authoritien obtained evidence of
umugf^ling by an alleged employee of the Company. The
proverbial "little black book"^ cuppocodly containing
tho namei and addronEOO of 25 Soviet agontn working in
the UIjA and Japan had al:::o been diccovorod, The affair
acc^uiceA. the anpoctn of a grand fiacco, Iloatodly, Chairman
Bogdanov protested Amtorg* s innocence. Attorney CeneralXO.
1^*9. Iliiii. » p. 7^^
550. mi* July 26, 1.930
151. m. Ji'iy 27, 1930
Tuttlc Iciinely admitted that ho had "not docidod whether...
the mnn arrcrrted had boon acrociatod, . . with. . . Amtorf^".
Hic! only jurjtif ication for hie: curlier conclucion was
that ho had r.croly quoted from the tcctirr.ony of the
cucpcct. Movortholcsc, Federal invecticationc con-
tinued and within the cnno v/cek Federal agent c from
Attorney Generr IXR Tuttlc * c office dcccerided upon the
drug Gtoro of Jocoph P. Cchafran of New York City. Their
intention v;aL; to uncover what thoy had teen led to bclievo
v.'ac a centre of secret Communist activity. The raid was
or.barascinGly abortive. Schafran stated that he was not
a Communist, but a "Tammany man and a m.embcr of the Pontiac
Dom.ocratic Club." Understandably irritated, Schafran
queried, "V/hy don't they after }!enry Ford? }Ie too
docs business v/itli Soviet Russia. The only difference
between him and :nc is that he sells them automobiles
and tractors and all I sell Amtorg is herbs and toothpaste.
Revelations such as these did more harm than good to the
anti-communist cause. Situations initially built up
to appear formidable were discovered in reality to be
ludicrous. The investigations were almost an instinctive
152. Iin!i~'uly ::9» ^ 3
^
153. im:. J^jiy 30, 1930.
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action on the part of the adninistr-tion, harascod as it
wac by daily protect of Soviet undercGlling. Gradually,
it bocE-mo apparent to many, including bucinecsnen, that
not only was the evidence cf the Com:nunist activities
flimsy and untrurjtv/orthy, but also that cuEpectod activ-
ities
.
had been blo-A^ up out of all proportion. And
just as the Federal investigation of "chafran had failed
to reveal any evidence of a communist plot or conspiracy,
so too did the hearings conducted by Assistant Secretary
S. Lov,'mnn-"'fail to provide conclusive evidence, either
that pulpv/ood was being processed by convict labor, or
that the Soviets v/ore underselling it in the American
market. Consequently, the embargo was lifted en August 1st,
1930 1 a similar decision v.-as reached by Secretary of the
Treasury Andrew V/, Mellon, regarding Soviet export of
154
manganese on February 24, I93I,
Despite official negation of an embargo policy,
attempts were made periodically by the anti-communists
to obtain one. Many American businessmen, hov/ever, rejected
this uncomprom.ising position and continued to believe that
improved US-Soviet relations would lead to a profitable
l^^. Journp.l of Ccrr-rce . (Now York}. Feb. 25, 1931.
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increase in trade. During tha embargo crisis, several
business spoliesmen stressed that Soviet cooperation with
American industries was esssntial. For example, George V/,
Sisson, who was closely connected v/ith the timber industry,
pointed out that 6ixice the pulpv/ood from the Adirondack
forests was nearly exhausted, supplies had to come from
somevmere. Almost ^lO^ of Canadian wood was unexportable
and if Soviet pulpwood could not be imported then his
company's paper plant would be forced to close. '^^^ Other
industries v/ere also adversely affected by the embargo,
while representatives of the New York Stevedores Union
complained of unernploiTnent, since they were forbidden
1 "^6by the embargo to unload and reload Soviet pulpwood.
Everything seem.ed to suggest that the latter had not in-
jured American labor or industry, but that it was in facti
a necessity. The threat of unemployment was undoubtedly
instrumental in making the People's Lobby severely
criticise Matthew V/oll's repeated requests for a general
155. •Rnr'i^h nnd Shi-n-inr.f S-vlet Econom ic Trp.deT(New Yorki
Horace Liveright, Inc. 1931) P- 93. Mr. Sisson was
president of the Raquctte Paper Co., past president
of the American Paper and Pulp Association; member of
the Exec. Committee of National Commission on Wood Util-
isation, US. Dept. of Commerce; President, Empire State
Forest Products Assoc.,; member of N.E. Forest Research
Council for Federal Forest Experimental Station, Amherst,
Mass. Director cf American Forestry Association.
156. liiid. I pp. 9^^-95.
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embargo on Soviet goods. The Lobby caustically declared
that V/oll could not possibly spoak for all organised
labor, since his organisation represented only 3,100,000
of ^1-7,000,000 employed A.^.ericans. '^^'^ Businessmen also
became more outspoken in their opposition to embargoes
in general. For example, a group of Brookl^^Ti businessmen,
who had had direct contacts v;ith Amtorg, quickly came to
the defence of the Russians as traders. The Export Steam-
ship Company (a Brookl:^^! line) operating betvreen Nov/ York
and Leningrad, reported excellent business relations, 0.3.
Whittaker, of Sperry Gyroscope Company, which had a technica
assistance contract with a Russian Electric trust, v;as even
more specific. He stated that his cor.pany had "never had
any grievance against the gentlemen of the USSR" with whom
they. had traded, neither did they expect any. He complemente
Soviet traders by saying "...Their word is good and they
scarcely resemble the m.oving picture notion of v/hiskered
anarchists. '-^
Official administration policy since 191? had
always been to acknowledge a separation betv.-een politics
and economics v/hen discussing the Soviet Union, This facade
157. Iim, July 29, 1930
158. NYT . August 1, 1930
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was maintdined during the embargo crisis. For example,
the Ti-'nq: quoted an "authoritative VJhitc House source"
as stating that the soverranent's attitude to "Russian "bus--
iness" was "not tacod on itc official attitude tov;ard3
the character of the Coviet goverrjnent, " -"^ This enabled
President Hoover to oppose the dectructicn of all American-
Soviet trade, while deploring cominunism and the Soviet
system. I'^oreover, the crisis demonstrated that this division
v.'as unrealistic, since many who supported the embargo pol-
icy did so for political as well as economic reasons.
The pro-Russian traders also had something else v:orking
in their favor. The financial and economic situation in
America was such that few could afford to turn dovm orders
and contracts that came their way. Presumably facts such
as these account for the reluctance of President Hccver to
support the embargo efforts v;holehcartedly and for the .
rapid modification in the attitudes of Assistant Secretary
Seymour Lov.nian. Formerly a vehement antagonist of Amtorg,
and its president Bogdanov, Lowman by early 1931 > considered
that an em.bargo policy "would mean the loss of about $120,
000,000 a year in. .. trade with this nation, for they [the
159. EHi, J^^-ly 30, 1930.
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Riujsianri^^ ^-^^ ^'^^^^ in spite of all the stories... to the
contrary, and they will certainly not buy from a country
that docG not buy from theiR."~^''^ Despite its official
policy therefore, the Hoover Administration acknowledged the
importance of overseas trade with the USSR and we c^ji discer
the initial stages of official acceptance of an economic
and political fact of life.
By 1931 » the commercial aspect also dominated
the minds of Congressional circles. At a hearing in I93I
before the House Committee on VJays and Kcans on a proposed
embargo on Soviet goods, John B, Trevor of the /vmerican
Coalition of Patriotic Societies got short shrift from
the r..embcrs. In his testimony, Trevor had argued that a
com.prehcnsive em.bargo would be a useful means of arresting
the advance of communism in the United States. He was,
he stated, concerned with the "principle" of the matter,
whereas he considered that the committee were concerned
merely v;ith the possibility of losing export trade, in
this Mr. Trevor showed considerable prescience, for trade
did oF^erge as the dominant consideration of the Committee,
160. NY^. Jan. 19» 1931.
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Tho responses of ono Con*.Tn5.ttce r.Gmber, Congressman Heartsill
Racorio from Arkansar, is v;orth quoting in full, ninco it "
rcvoals to v/hat oxtont the corr.nnercial acpoctD of the embargo
cricie had per-noated national politics. His words also
adequately sum up the position of many of the *prc~Soviet*
businessmen. "While I do not approve of the Russian form
of government," said Ragon, "yet what v/e are interested in
here is the economic effect that a thing like this |\n
embargo^ v.'ould have. V's cannot afford to sacrifice the inter-
ests of this country in the cconcmic condition that it is .
in nov/| in order to be patriotic, and patriotic societies
have no monopoly 6n patriotism in this country. Politically
v;e are against them, but arc v;c against them com.mercially?
1 61
That is the question."
Thus, the convenient division between politics
and economics was maintained, but events had shown that in
many areas eccncm.ic problcm.s could not be left to the
individual businessman to solve. The power and machinery
of the state v;as needed and inevitably American-Russian
trade and commerce entered the realm of national politics.
1^-1 y,^y^y.r-ry 0(^,r^rv+ r>-p^ 1 t s 1 Hearings before the Com.m.ittee
on V/ays and Tioans, House of Representatives, /1st
Congress, 3rd. Session, on H.R. 16035 (February 19, 20,
21 i '1931) Washington D.C: Government Printing Office,
1931, pp. 21-29.
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The 'dumping* and embargo c^npj'.ign^ of the oarly
1930' 3 had had an adverse effect cn American-Soviet trade
relations. From a pca^ of over $11^5 million of US exports
in 1930* there had been a drop in 1.931 to $103 million,
$12 million in 1932 and $8 million in 1933. There were
other im.portant reasona for the decline: commercial tills
of Amtorg coiild not be diaccuntcd and rc-dicccunted by
barJkG cf the Federal Recerve syEtem; Soviet organisations
had no judicial status in .'Vm.ericaj and therefore had nc
right to court protection; absence of consuls m.eant diff-
iculties over authenticating legal documsntsj Soviet gold
was not allowed into the United States, thereby handicapping
the Soviet Union in covering her unfavorable trade balance.
But by far the greatest Soviet grievance was the difficulty
in obtaining extended American credits. The situation
became serious and both sides appeared to be caught in a
vicious circle. The Russians could not trade freely with-
out credits: the Americans were reluctant to extend long-
term credits because trade relations v;ere not officially
regulated. The hope that official recog^iition of the USSR
would help place trade on an organised, legitimate basis
provided some of the monientum behind the recognition move-
ment.
Calls for recognition greatly accelerated during
the 1930 's but a considerable body of opinion had advocat-
ed such action in the mid-1920' s. Most of the articles
and statmonts made some reference to the trading advantages
that recognition might bring to both countries. For example,
an editorial in th3 Natiori maintained that large credits
v.'ould be impossible to grant to the USSR "until official •
recognition" gave a "new and evident stability to the
situation." The article pointed cut that the largest
American credits received by the Russians came indirectly
through British and German agents: direct contact would
speed up communication and would assist in reducing European
competition for the Soviet market. This article also pred-
icted prophetically, that a time would come when "Big Busines
163
would "force the Government to recognise the Bolsheviks.
"
The hope of increased trade and an improved world market
for /^jncrican goods v.'as undoubtedly one of the factors which
prompted recognition.
162. The Nation . Oct. 21, 1925f p. ^53.
163. Ibid.
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Incroasinsly it v/rjr; rcaliccd that credit diff-
icultioF; v^^re the main obctacles to closer trade. American
huGincGsmcn knev/ that larger credits wore the ansv/er, but
many remained distrustful of the Russians, and fearful
of debt repudiation and the possibility of having contracts
invalidated. These fears endured for at least two
decades, dospitu the fact that Soviet organisations in the
United States had always mot their financial and contract-
ual obligations. A residue of suspicion lingered on in
finnnci^l minds, nurtured by propaganda on both sides, In
addition, American businessmen who found themselves in
commercial or financial difficulties with the Soviet Union
had no recourse to assistance from their own government.
These themes were developed in an article published
in the I.itorarv ^i^est , in August 1929. Here it was argued
that the most potent reason for official recognition of the
Soviet Union v/as that "American dollars" were already "rec-
ognising Russia quite thoroughly". ''"^^ T\\e author listed
four other reasons for diplomatic contact: first, the United
States was Russia's second best customer^ second, Russian^
purchases from the United States amounted to $100,000,000
I6l\, Iin, Oct. 2/4, 1928
165. T.iternrv Dir-QSt, Aumist 17. 1929, "The American Dollar
talks with Russia", pp. 8-9.
a year; third, the Soviet Union thought highly of Ar.orican
technical a.hilities and usod it to develop itn own industry}
fourth, commercial contacts provided v.-elcorao custoiners for
hard-prG3CGd American manufacturers.,''"^^ That ever-recurr-
ing belief in the extent and importance of the Soviet markets
v.'as clearly shov-Ti in quotations from various ncv/spapors
and journals reprinted in the same Liter-^r^r ni^Pr.t article.
The Nov/ York World ' considered it not at all surprisin-^
that businezsmon should favor recognition, especially
when one acknov/ledged tho "peculiar situation of a growing
foreign trade without benefit of consular service, commercial
attaches or any other agency of the American goverrjnent. "'"^'^
"Business", remarked the Charleston Hews -^nd C^^^rier "does
not care how the Soviet Government cam>e into power." "
Th2 Now York Jcurn"^! of Commrro^ . urging that Am.erica
should take advantage of the opportunities offered by the
Soviet markets, added, "We are not likely to do so in the
fullest degree, so long as our Goverfvment insists that no
16q
such thing exists as Soviet Russia." ' This call for a
realistic attitude to v/hat, after all, was now an established





fact of life, coupler] with tho fact that the oconoinic
nituntion did not nllov/ Airiorlca tho luxury of oolocting
itn trading:: pnrtnorn, f;rontly roflucod tho f fToctivonosB
of the opponnntn of rccofipnitiont
To wh'i t extent did tho pro-roco^^itl on nttitudon
of ;;;.'iiiy bur; t iiur.LjiMQn niicl fhi.Mnciora inriuoncc AMmi nj i; trnti on
policy in tho question of tho Covic L Union? While it is
difl'icult b) r;pocific, tho potential influence appeared
i^rcat. It h:i'i b'Tii domonntratod that Amorican-Soviot trade
could flourish and expand without nf^vernrr.ontal nanctionn.
V/hat might it not do with tho confidence or tho Adrniniatrat-
ion rnd With Iho cornfortinc Knov/Loilr.o that diplomatic nasiot-
ance might bo called in to !3orvo in an omorKoncy? To Incrcrmo
public receptivity of roco,";nitl on, ."^^cnornl :'rLlclou on
Ruarjia ho,";:m to npponrj l:h(>r.c :; Li-( :::;cd inany of the problcma
faced by bunincsamon which hopol'ully v/ould bo eradicated
by official rococni tion. Two cuch articlea appeared in Arlii*
and in Ft;»ytu] >o . In tlio former, William C. V/hitc produced a
couTcfui WUtoCvj o? Sovict-AmoricMn trade rclationn from the
end of Worlfl War T, covorln,"; tho part played by Amtorr nnd
cmphaaizinr: tho Soviet need for Americnn credl t-j. Wlilto
170. Ailhi, November, 1930, vol.XXX, pp. 7'l7-75'»-.
recorded credits as moct "vital and conplicatod in the
I
whole field of Soviet-AmGrican relaticnc. "'"^-^ He added
that 80fo of all orders placed by Amtcrg were on a credit
basis, and that the terir.n of credit varied considerably.
Ho declared that inanufncturers v/cro finding it difficult
to sell to the U3SR, partly from uncertainty about the
security of the Soviet economic system and partly "because
of a lacl: of some foirm of American recognition. "''"'^'^ The
writer 'of the Fo^t'^^e article v;as concerned v;ith v/hat
he described as American ignorance about the Soviet Union.
The journal considered it had a responsibility tc over-
come the recurrent "waves and winds of mdsconception"
surrounding the Soviet Union. In an effort to overcome
the "ignorance cor.plex", several articles followed, variou
ly titled "The Soviet State", the "Russian Peasant", and
the "Five Year Plan". Liberally interspersed with photo-
graphs and vivid illustrations of Soviet posters, the
articles v/ere devoted to the explosion of the current
American myths, "'"'^-^ A further means of attracting attention
to the recognition issue was to publicise the difficulties
being experienced at this time by A.ratorg. THe company's
171. Xb;j ,
172. Ibjd .
173. Fortune . March 1932f pp. 57-90f 125-130.
chiGf problem, of cource, vras thr.t of creditG. It was
roportod that v/herea!? Ei^rop^anc wgtg offering ?.2~J0 month
credit to the Soviet Union, many American firmn offered
only 6 months. It was inferred that if official recognition
took place, American financicro v;ould Ic-. more v;illing to
offer favcra1:lG and competitive credits
. Non-rccogniticn
v;as beginning to have far-reaching ccncequoncec,
,
particul-
arly in tv7o areas. Firct, lack of official reasGurahce
an.d a sluggish economy prevented many American businessmen
frrom even entering US-rsSR commerce, let alone providing
adequate credits for Soviet traders. Second, (and a ref]ect~
ion of the first) Amtorg was unable to maintain 'its -
previous levels of business. 1931 -Jiw a drop in purchasing
pov;er from $88, '100,000 to $'1-8,500,000; in an econom.y m.ove,
1 7hAmtorg* c staff was cut back by S^fj, '
Professor Robert Erov/der has argued that economic
concerns wore not the primary m.otive behind Am.erican reccg-
nition of the Soviet Union, in Novcm.ber, 1933." He has
atated that Russia had a greater desire for political than
economic relations and that it was fundamentally concerned
with political recognition by the USA, although it used trade
:i NYT. Sc-ot. 26, 1931; Nov*- 18, 1931.
175. R.P.Brov.'der, r^ir-.ir^r, of r^vi-'-'-^r^r^ rn r^ p3plpry:?.?v
(New Jorsoyi Princeton University Press, 1953.
)
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as B. v/eapon. The impetus for Russian overtures to the United
States, according to Erov/der, v/as the Japanese entry into-
Manchuria. This dcveloprient, he declared, made the Soviet
Union seek political ^'-""^'"'"ohc.r.T'nt v.'ith the United States
with an urgency trade could not produce. And what of the
Americans? Here Professor Erowdcr has maintained that
United States' "businessmen reached the peak of interest
in econoiTiic relations only at the end of the period,
when the depression deepened and Soviet orders declined.
Furthermore, he has pointed out that the high hopes
fostered by the business community for increased trade
were delusions} the anticipated commercial expansion
with Russia did not come.
It is true that, on the eve of recognition,
political and diplomatic considerations did supersede
those of trade, particularly in governmental circles.
Hov;over^ interest in American-Soviet trade had been sus-
tained and increased, as Professor Erov;der has indicated,
through the years 1930-1933. The domination of political
and diplomatic factors arose because it became obvious,
especially to concerned American businessmen, that only
176. liiid.
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be ncanc of formal recognition could the nunicrouG credit
and la^s^l probleir.s "arising from American-Scviet trade be
colvcd. It iz alao true that the expected curge in United
States* exports to the Soviet Union did not materialiee.
On the other hand, the b'JcinesG conmunity thought that
exports- would undoubtedly increase and that rceogi^ition
vrauld further this end. Merely because American industrial-
ists and financiers may have been over-optirdstic in their
estimates of potential Russian trade, it does not follow
that their arguments for recognition were any lees telling
at the time.
Official recognition of the Soviet Union may
have proved a mixed blessing, but surely it was .not a curse.
If it is difficult to establish trade as the main motive
behind recognition, American business interests v/ere
ne^/e^H^e^t<^.
well attended to in the terms of the final document..
For example, a trade agreement was reached between
the
two countries in 1935. Tariff reductions were
extended to
the Soviet Union, which in turn agreed to
purchase $30,000,
000 worth of goods from the United States in 1936.
The
success of this agreem^ent led to its
renewal up to 19^0,
and the guaranteed sum rose to $^0,000,000
after 1937.
These cuTTis v;ero much Iczz than thoc^c. of the early thirties,
and indeed, T.uoh lees th^n prcclicte^, but r-^rVn-- +v
^
I
vvac to be expected. Both countries now dealt with each- other
on a different level and both deerned it prudent to progress
cautiously. Apart from this, the recent dumping and embargo
crisis had created much ill feeling and, consequently,
had di;:located trade. It would take time for businessmen
of both countries to regain their confidence. And in time,
advances were made. In 1937 the United States overtook
Germany as first exporter to the Soviet Union. Thus, recurrent
American fears of German infiltraticn into the Russian
market v;ere dispelled. As for A.mtcrg, preparations for its
enlargement were under way only one month after President
Roosevelt had made his agreer.ent with Maxim Litvinov,
Soviet Foreign Minister. Plans v.'ore also made to resume
publication of the monthly periodical, Cet-^l^.-u-^^ of Amerieen
Industry ?^nd Trn-^e in Kursia . produced by Amtorg for the
177benefit of Am.erican exporters. Much of this progress v/as
made possible by official recognition: the Soviet promise
contained an agreement to cease revolutionary propaganda
in the United States, and an agreement to discuss a debt
settlement. In return, the United States granted dc jnrs.
177. lilT, Dec. 3» 1-933.
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recognition to the Soviet Union. Treaties could now be made,
and r^rcenientG reached on ccor.oriic and trading matters
v/hich v/ere to "be of mutual benefit.
XVJL-
ThG Amoric-n bucinDGs community
, throughout"
the period 19l7~l933t resardod the Soviet Union v;ith
ambivalence. In the realm of finance and commerce, its
aim had been to explore and exploit a Rncsian market
predicted to be of rich potential. In so doing, businessmen
and bankers hoped to oust European countries, especially
Germany, from their preferred trading positions with the
Soviet Union. These aims were maintained, despite initial
American confusion about, and subsequent abhorrence of,
the Bolshevik revolution. In the two decades fcllov/ing
I917f the Bolsheviks, particularly Trotsky, v/ere presented
in business papers and journals as "bogey-menV, Bolshevism
itself was regarded as essentially evil and a mienace to
Yi'estern capitalism and democracy as a whole and to the ^
American versions in particular. And these attitudes rarely
chnnged, despite the grudging respect of American business
for the Five Year Plans and the desire for increased trade
during the depression years. In many respects, the increased
personal contact wrought by the technical assistance
program, reinforced these attitudes.
^1 O ^
In hictorical ar.rilyGiG .it i^: beet to or.it that
kind of adjectival qv.alification that makes everything good-
cr "badi blaC': cr v/hite. This hov;evor was not alv;ayn FosGible
at the tir.c and hardly to to expected. Nev.Tpaper:^ are largely
unccneerned v.'ith hicterical analysis and cot.s of the epinicns
cxprecced appear, in retreepcet, entirely euhjective, Mereover,
many of the event e of the period, eepecially the Rusr:ian
rcvolutionc and the ccono.iic dcprccirion v.'sre cataclyemic
in their effects and produced "or.trcmefs" of reaction. Ncvor-
thelesG, r.nny bueinces article:':, particularly those of the
jlcillirjilj v;ere ecrentially objective. Suslnese editors and
r.agaslnc v/riterc v;cre every bit as hard-headed and realistic
as the nembcrs of the cerrr.ereial errr.r.unity they quoted or
v;rote about. The writers v;ere all primarily interested in
hov; the American businessmen could mahe more money. Hence
their columns v;ere mere ccmmiercially, than politically, orien-
ted, and ;jeumalists or.erted every effort to promote American-
Soviet traae.
It is possible now to say that many of the fears
and doubts of the business com.m.unity towards Soviet Russia
were unfounded. But this can only be seen in the light of
time; not during the actual event. However, it must be
Ip.clniittod thr.-*: rnort biir5.n'?rrncn wr.ro prol^i'b?. y only Intcr-
estod In the poll tied uphc:;.7nlc of tho timo ar they
affcctod cor.ri'jrco and firsnnce. Thic. may explain v/hy rcpcrto
v;e.<xj often not crtrricd through tc a naticfactory concl'.icion
and v/hy one hsr *"o I'^ol" rlrcv/hcro f'^r ths rocultc of,
or f-r^quo]. to, one pnrticul^r ritory, Ono corcluDion that
c(u\ t.0 drr.'.vn frcr. thin titudy in that trado, itn cxtcnnion
and profitr, v/nf the tanc frciri v;hich the attitudcn of the
tunincEin con-.niunity of -'he Vnitcd ritatcc were formed*
In i:hin period
,
lip nervico v.'ar paid to tho idcalr of
"n:Ti<-. ricanicn" and th? horrorc of "bolnhcvir.;:n" i although
thoro ir.ay have tocn ir.rry vt.o alec telicvcd then:. An
avcr:.£;c turrinanciman' c ' reaction v.-ai't that if tho Rucnian market
wnc profitoL"'c, if dnbtn wore honcrod and contracts fair,
politics could tc left to the politicinnr; (and the nev.-npaporr)
while ho undertool: commerce to the bciocVLt of both ecimtries.
And thin v/an well undorctood at tho time. A cartoon
accurately erphasinec the point. ' t eppcared in tlio LiliJriiLry
ILU;o;ii , in and pictured r hostile "Uncle Sam"
rcfurinc a cj Kc on which wan written "Dolshevicm" . When it
wan returned to him covered with icing ond decorated with
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the word "trade"! he brightened considerably, saying: "J"ust
put it dovm, I may change my mind. " The caption underneath
Eumm.ed up the underlying meaning of the cartoon with the
words, "Cake looks better v;hon it*s frosted. "^"^^ In short,
Communist traders v;ere regarded as businessmen first, and
Communists second, and were judged according to the rules
of the trade.
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1929 •84.0 22. 5 1.6 0.5
1930 114.4 24.3 3.0 0. 8
1931 103.7 13.2 4.3 0.6
1932 .12.6 9.7 0. 8 0.7
1933 8.9 12.1 0.5 0.8
D.S.S.R. TRADE WITH U.S.A.




1925 12-0 21 '^5 16.2
1926 15.8 62.9









1932 B.8 1 . ,.8
1933 7.2
-Exports of one country do not always equal imports of
the
other country due to time lags in reporting
and slight
differences in custom appraisals.
M^^.^f^t>l^HiLg??3-rin InfQnnn.tion Bureau,
ex- President Theodore Roosevelt.
Edward N. Hurleys Chairman of the United States Shipping
Board.
Dr. N.r.1. Butler.
LawTence F. Abbottt editor of Outlook .
C. A. Coffin! head of General Electric Company."
Darv/in P.Kingsley t president of New York Life Insurance Co.
Samuel McRoberts : executive manager of the National City
Bank.
Charles H, Sabin t president of Guaranty Trust Co.
Jacob- Schiff
.
Oscar Strauss : chairman of New York Public Service
Commission.
( Gcorr^ Kennani Th:: T^ocislon Intgrvone (Princeton, 1'958)
^ n O O -> -3
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M£r.]?,g r;: <?r tli o Ai]3m.C-rm:::EiiS£iarL_Chamber of Commerc^fi.
Reeve Schley vice-president of Chase
National Bank and of Consol-
idated Coppermines Company.
E.Chappell Porter executive secretary
,
formerly
director of the N.Y. office of
Federal Bureau of Foreign and
Domestic Commerce.
Samuel McRoberts executive manager of National
City Bank.
Darwin P. Kin{rsley president of New York Life
Insurance Company.
Charles H. Sabin president of Guaranty Trust Co,
A.Barton Hepburn chairman, Chase National Bank's
Board of Directors.
Donald G.Win'r president of First National
Bank of Boston.
£i-nnf? represented incliidM«
Kidder, Peabody and Co.,














Westinghouse Air Brake Co.,
American Car and Foundry.
(rrincoton, I958)




Ito]2ar.n_a£_yi£_£^2JPldJ^ on Coinillg rce and My^rinP .
Robert F.Maddox president of the American Bankers'
Association and Atlanta National
Bank,
Lewis E.Pierson chairman of the Irving National
Bank, New York City,
Charles E. Sabin president of the Guaranty Trust
Company,
John McHugh vice-president of the Mechanics
•
. and Metals National Bank, N,Y,C.
Donald.G, Wing. president of First National Bank,
Boston.
Arthur Reynolds vice-president, Continental and
Commercial National Bank, Chicago.
William A. I-aw president of the First National
Bank, Philadelphia,
F,0. Watts president of the Third National
Bank, St. Louis.
Charles H.Hinsch president of the Third National
Bank, Cincinnati,
Thomas B. McAdams vice-president of the Merchants
National Bank, Richmond.
John E. Borden, Jr., president of the Whiney-Central
National Bank, New Orleans.
James J.Fagan vice-president of the Crocher
National Bank, San Francisco,
Rohort N.Karpor pronidont of t\\Q DiBLrlot
National Bnnlc, Wash., D.C.
John L. Hamilton prccidont of tlic Americnn
Guaranty Company, Columbun
Senator Joncph Franco, of Maryland.


















Dwight P. Robinson and ComDany
Morison Steam Shovel Company
Austin Company




United States National Bank.
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